Motion in Limine Order in Quinton v. Toyota Addresses Crashworthiness in Modern Era



Earlier this week, I blogged about a recent trial of a Toyota Camry rollover case, which resulted in a defense verdict on June 21, 2013.  Prior to the trial, the Court issued a pre-trial Order in response to a motion in limine filed by Plaintiff's counsel.  The Order can be found here, and it is worthy of further commentary because it addresses crashworthiness in South Carolina.  It also references recent case law in which our courts have hinted at moving toward the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998).  So...let's take a closer look.

To re-cap, the general facts relating to Quinton v. Toyota Motor Corporation can be found in this post.  Generally, the case involved a rollover of a 2009 Toyota Camry that resulted in the death of the driver (and sole occupant).  As stated in the Order, Plaintiff brought the case under the crashworthiness doctrine because she alleged the air bag failed to deploy properly during the accident. (Order at 2).  As a result, she claimed "enhanced injury" when the accident occurred, resulting in the death of the driver.  (Id).  Therefore, prior to trial, Plaintiff moved to exclude all evidence related to causation or fault. 

The Court began by summarizing prior South Carolina case authority on the crashworthiness doctrine.  Quoting from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Jiminez v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439, 452 (4th Cir. 2001), the Court noted that "'liability [in a crashworthiness case] is imposed not for defects that cause collisions but for defects that cause injuries after collisions occur.'"  (Order at 2) (quoting id.).  In Jiminez, the district court excluded evidence of causation in a crashworthiness case.  The defendant had argued that because South Carolina adopted comparative negligence, the driver's alleged negligence was relevant to a damages calculation.  In concluding that the district court committed no error, the Jiminez Court noted that South Carolina had not addressed the issue of whether causation was relevant in a a crashworthiness analysis, and there was a split of authority on the issue.  Although the Court was not certain what the rule would be in South Carolina, it could not conclude that the the district court had erred in light of the fact that -- under the crashworthiness doctrine -- the cause of the original accident was not relevant to proving a claim for enhanced injury.  (Order at 2-3). 

Since Jiminez, the Court recognized that South Carolina courts still have not directly addressed this issue.  The Court offered to certify the question to the South Carolina Supreme Court, but the parties declined.  Therefore, the Court tried to ascertain how South Carolina courts would rule on it.  (Order at 3).

The Court reviewed that Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 220, 701 S.E.2d 5, 14 (2010) "embraced the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998)."  (Order at 3).  Noting this trend, the Court cited to the comments in Restatement (Third) section 16 and the notion that a plaintiff's fault in causing an action that causes defect-related increased harm is relevant to apportioning responsibility.  (Order at 3-4) (emphasis added).  The Court noted that Jiminez did not hold that South Carolina would not admit evidence of cause in a crashworthiness analysis.  Rather, Jiminez only concluded there was no error by the district court under then-existing South Carolina law.  (Order at 4).

Since Jiminez, the Court noted that South Carolina has adopted comparative negligence, and its Supreme Court cited Restatement (Third) and its comments with approval in Branham.  (Order at 5).  The Court also noted that a majority of jurisdictions that considered the issue have held that comparative negligence is appropriately considered in a crashworthiness case.   Finally, the Court cited to language in Jiminez's dissent to support that a jury has to assess behavior of both the plaintiff and the defendant in a crashworthiness case to determine causation. The Court also agreed that the evidence was relevant to the analysis and conclusions of the experts accident reconstruction.  (Id.). 

The Order continues to show what this blog has maintained in numerous posts: Branham was a "game changer" in South Carolina products liability law.  Whether it leads to a definitive adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998) by the Legislature remains to be seen, although our Legislature also made those overtures during the last round of tort reform.  We'll see...

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Recent Publication (and Summary of South Carolina Non-Contractual Indemnification, Contribution, and Comparative Negligence Law)

As I have stated in prior posts, my law firm is a member of the Primerus society of law firms, and I am on its Products Liability Executive Committee.  Toward the latter part of 2011, our committee decided to do a compendium in which we would provide a state-by-state summary of the law of non-contractual indemnity.  We sought out volunteers for each state, provided a form template, and requested summaries for each state.  We requested that authors be sure to include any nuances specific to products liability law in their summary.

It was quite a bit of work.  In addition to writing the submission for South Carolina, I also reviewed ten or fifteen submissions for other states in order to ensure some measure of uniformity for each summary. 

The compendium in its entirety is now online, and you can find it at this link.  Although our Products Liability Group took the lead on it (and it includes substantial products liability case law), it is also a good primer on the general law of non-contractual indemnification, contribution, and fault allocation for each state.  My submission for South Carolina can be found here.  In it, you will find a general summary of South Carolina's comparative negligence law, its Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, joint and several liability, the law of equitable (non-contractual) indemnification, and contribution.

With regard to any nuances in South Carolina relating to products liability law, the primary one relates to the fact that there is no right of equitable indemnity between mere joint tortfeasors.  Vermeer v. Wood/Chuck Chipper Corp., 336 S.C. 53, 64, 518 S.E.2d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Scott v. Fruehauf Corp., 302 S.C. 364, 396 S.E.2d 354 (1990); Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E.2d 552 (1983); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963)).  As context, joint tortfeasors are parties who act together in committing a wrong, or whose acts (if independent of each other) unite in causing a single injury.  Stated differently, joint tortfeasors are two or more persons jointly or severally liable for the same injury to person or property.  Vermeer, 336 S.C. at 64, 518 S.E.2d at 307 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 839 (6^th ed. 1990).  “Parties that have no legal relation to one another and who owe the same duty of care to the injured party share a common liability and are joint tortfeasors without a right of indemnity between them.”  Id.  Determining whether parties are joint tortfeasors requires a review of the factual evidence.  Id. 

This is significant in the context of products liability action.  South Carolina’s courts have held that where parties owe the same duty of care and have no legal relationship to one another, then they are joint tortfeasors and have a common liability without a right of equitable indemnity.  Scott, 302 S.C. at 371, 396 S.E.2d at 358.  For example, South Carolina’s strict liability statute makes each party in the chain of distribution (e.g., manufacturer, distributor, retailer) liable for sale of a defective product.  Vermeer, 336 S.C. at 65, 518 S.E.2d at 307-08 (citing to S.C. Code § 15-73-10 (1977)).  Therefore, if a plaintiff is injured by a product and sues a party in the chain of distribution, there is no right of indemnification between the parties in the chain of distribution.  See, e.g., Scott v. Fruehauf Corp., 302 S.C. 364, 396 S.E.2d 354 (1990) (holding there was no right of indemnity between co-defendants involved in distribution of a defective wheel assembly that exploded and injured plaintiff because both co-defendants shared common liability under South Carolina’s strict liability law).  Each party has a common duty and common liability to the ultimate consumer under the strict liability statute, making them joint tortfeasors. Conversely, if a party-defendant’s use of a product plays a role in causing injury to a plaintiff (independent of any fault of the alleged tortfeasor), then the product seller may be liable for indemnification.  See, e.g., Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E.2d 552 (1983) (holding that purchaser of mechanical harvesting machine had right of indemnity against seller in case where harvesting machine was mounted on truck, caused purchaser to lose control of truck, and ultimately caused injury to passengers in oncoming vehicle).

You can find all of the above and more in the South Carolina submission.  Enjoy.

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