Showing posts with label Negligence Per Se (Statutory). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Negligence Per Se (Statutory). Show all posts

Thursday, December 29, 2011

Holiday Season Food Law (Part IV): The food poisoning cases

(This is the fourth post in my holiday series in which I am surveying South Carolina's products liability case law involving food/beverage.  See also part I, part II, and part III). 

As Christmas is behind us and New Year's Day is around the corner, it seems appropriate to begin bringing this series to a conclusion by talking about food that just flat out makes you sick. 

This Saturday evening, people around the world will ring in 2012 with all sorts of food and beverage, and undoubtedly some of them will just become sick for no apparent reason (other than maybe imbibing a bit too much).  There is another line of cases in South Carolina where the lawsuit relates to food that just made someone sick...no fragments of glass, no exploding bottles, no animal carcasses in the food.  The plaintiff just eats/drinks something and gets food poisoning of some variation.  If you are one of these unfortunate individuals, this post is dedicated to you.

In Gantt v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E.2d 641 (1940), a man became sick after drinking a soft drink he believed contained some kind of poisonous substance.  Only after analysis by some chemists was it determined that the soft drink contained copper sulphate (which apparently is used by farmers to protect crops from rust).  7 S.E.2d at 642.  The plaintiff sued for negligence (in bottling of the soft drink, inspection, etc.), and the jury awarded $2,000.  Id.  On appeal, the defendant argued (1) there was no evidence it bottled the drink or that it contained the substance at the time of bottling, and (2) there was no evidence from which a jury could conclude it was negligent.  Id. at 643.  In a detailed opinion, the court pointed out that the only evidence of negligence was a violation of the applicable Pure Food Statute at the time (i.e., making it negligence per se if there is some poisonous or deleterious substance in the food).  Id.  It did not matter that the plaintiff failed to plead the statute in his Complaint, and "neither knowledge of the contamination nor negligence in fact is a material element of the offense."  Id.  It is negligence per se under the law, and this alone is sufficient for consideration by the jury.  Id. at 645.  However, the court reversed the case and remanded for a new trial.  Id. at 645-46.  Why?  Because the trial judge excluded testimony by the defendant the instance at issue was the only time that copper sulphate had been found in the soft drink bottled by the defendant.  Id. at 646.  In short, if the plaintiff can get the case to the jury by just showing violation of the statute, the defendant also should be able to offer testimony relevant to the standard of care, and failure to allow this testimony required a new trial.

Yummy processed and potted meat.  Love it.  My dad's generation sure did, as I often heard stories of "eating Vi-enner sausages in the field" while growing up.  I will pass, thank you very much (especially after reading Upton Sinclair's The Jungle in my high school history class).  Nevertheless, there are three South Carolina cases I have found involving potted/processed meat, and reading them is pure entertainment.  

Housand v. Armour & Co., 173 S.C. 268, 175 S.E. 516 (1934) involved consumption of "oil sausage" sold in 50-pound cans and retrieved via "an old fork which hung from the counter" in the retail shop."  175 S.E. at 517.  This is a strange case in which the "defendant" Armour was found to not actually be the right defendant, but they answered and went to trial anyway.  Ultimately, the judgment against the defendant corporation was reversed based on lack of evidence of negligence and improper expert testimony.  Id. at 518.  The court affirmed the judgment against the local defendants based on how they handled the meat (i.e., not keeping it refrigerated).  Id. at 518-20.  Hollis v. Armour & Co., 190 S.C. 170, 2 S.E.2d 681 (1939) also involved oil sausages, and the offending sausages in this case were sold from cans that had rusted.  The concept of preemption rears its head in this early case, as one of the defendant's arguments was that the State Pure Food Statute interfered with federal acts and regulations.  2 S.E.2d at 684-85.  The court disagreed, and it also believed the plaintiff had adequately pled a violation of the State Pure Food Statute so as to sustain the $1,500 award by the jury to the plaintiff.  Id. at 685.  Finally, Boylston v. Armour & Co., 196 S.C. 1, 12 S.E.2d 34 (1940) involved a ham that had a "bluish-greenish cast" that is "not unusual" in a cooked, smoked ham.  12 S.E.2d at 37.  (Uhhh...okay).  Contrary to the holding in Hollis, the Boylston court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial on grounds that the applicable State Pure Food Statute did not apply; it only applied to manufacture or sale or offer for sale of food within the state, and there was evidence that the meat at issue was prepared and sold out of state.  Id. at 38. 

Poor Armour.  These cases are a mixed-up potted mess, and reading them can be exhausting.  The above summary does not do them justice.  If you have an interest in potted meat cases, I encourage you to read them for yourself.

Last but not least, Fowler v. Coastal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 252 S.C. 579, 167 S.E.2d 572 (1969) involved a three-year-old child who became sick after drinking a soft drink that contained something "dark in color and slick and slimy to the touch."  A pathologist determined that the substance was yeast, and he testified that certain yeasts can cause certain diseases.  Id. at 582, 167 S.E.2d at 574.  The problem was that the plaintiff's doctor testified there had been a rash of viruses at the time, and he could not say whether the plaintiff's sickness was from the virus or from the yeast in the soft drink.  Id. at 583, 167 S.E.2d at 574.  Although the court recognized a violation of the Pure Food and Drug Act in effect at the time constituted negligence per se, the plaintiff still had to show proximate causation. 
We have held that where the cause of plaintiff's injury may be as reasonably attributed to an act for which the defendant is not liable as to one for which he is liable, the plaintiff has failed to carry the burden of establishing that his injury was the proximate result of defendant's negligence.
Id. at 575, 167 S.E.2d at 584.  Based on this law, the court reversed the judgment because plaintiff failed to prove proximate causation.

This is the last group of cases in this series.  In my next (concluding) post for this series, I will do my best to synthesize my blogs on food and beverage case law and bring some "order" to them.

Happy New Year!

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Monday, December 19, 2011

Holiday Season Food Law (Part II): Careful with that salmon (salmon?)...Santa.

(This is the second post in my holiday series in which I am surveying South Carolina's products liability case law involving food/beverage.  See part I here).

There are certain "non-traditional" movies I associate with Christmas, and I love this scene from "Trading Places" where Dan Akroyd plays a down and out Santa Claus who is swiping holiday goodies from a Christmas party.  My favorite part is when he steals a nice piece of salmon, stuffs it into his jacket, and then pulls it out later to feast on it while riding a bus.

The question is, what happens if -- when he bites into that salmony, beard-encrusted goodness -- he bites down on some hard substance or object and breaks a tooth?  Let's discuss this "bucket" of cases.

♪ ♫  On the second day of Christmas, my true love gave to me...A CHRISTMAS COOKIE WITH A TACK IN IT! ♪ ♫

Most of these cases involve alleged negligence by the manufacturer in either the manufacture or post-manufacture inspection of the food product.  The earliest case I have found in this group of cases is Delk v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 180 S.C. 436, 186 S.E. 383 (1936). 

Delk involved a man who bought some chewing tobacco and, after putting some in his mouth, bit down on a carpet tack.  (Ouch).  The nerve of the tooth died, the tooth became infected, and he could not consume anything but liquids for ten days.  186 S.E. at 348. Plaintiff brought a lawsuit, and the defendant moved at trial for non-suit based on (1) absence of a contractual relationship with the plaintiff, and (2) lack of proof of negligence.  Id. at 385.  The motions were denied and the plaintiff won $500.  Id. The defendant appealed based on the same aforementioned grounds, as well as an erroneous charge by the judge.  Id. With regard to the privity of contract issue, the court held the trial court was not in error because chewing tobacco qualifies as a "food," and liability will exist regardless of privity of contract.  Id. at 385-86. However, the court agreed with the defendant that there was lack of proof of negligence.

It is true that negligence may be established by circumstantial evidence as well as by positive evidence; but it is also a well settled precept founded upon the soundest principles of justice that a verdict must be supported by the evidence and not based upon conjecture, speculation, and surmise. Has [plaintiff] adduced testimony, positive or circumstantial, sufficient to show negligence on the part of appellant? We think not. The plug of tobacco was carried around in his pocket until he had taken four or five chews of same, and there was no proof of an impression made by the tack on or in said plug to show that when the tobacco was pressed the tack became a part of said plug. It is entirely possible that this tack could have become imbedded in this plug during the time that it was in possession of the jobber, retailer, or respondent.
Id. at 387.  On this basis, the court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant.  Id. at 388.  Although the defendant's third ground for appeal (the erroneous jury charge) was largely moot, the court found the charge was not erroneous in light of its determination that tobacco qualified as a "food."  Id.

Delk is somewhat of an anomaly in this line of cases because it involved tobacco.  This is significant because although the court believed tobacco was "food" for purposes of its negligence analysis, it did not believe that tobacco should be classified as "food" for purposes of the Pure Food and Drug Act in effect at the time.  Id. at 386.  This is a significant distinction because subsequent cases involving more common food products involve an additional statutory line of analysis when assessing negligence.

For example, both Irick v. Peoples Baking Co., 187 S.C. 238, 196 S.E. 887 (1938) and McKenzie v. Peoples Baking Co., 205 S.C. 149, 31 S.E.2d 154 (1944) involved plaintiffs who bit into cakes that had glass (Irick) and a piece of steel (McKenzie) embedded in them.  At trial, the defendants successfully moved for non-suit based on a lack of evidence of common law negligence (which was granted), and the plaintiffs appealed.  In both cases, the appellate courts reversed on grounds that the Pure Food and Drug Act in effect at the time applied to the food products, that presence of the foreign material constituted violations of same, and that a violation constituted per se negligence that required the cases to be submitted to the jury.  As stated by the McKenzie court:
[I]nclusion of a harmful foreign substance in cake prepared for human consumption (food) is a violation of our Pure Food Statute and negligence per se, and that Irick's case, supra, was correctly decided and should be adhered to, and it is. Nonsuit should not have been granted upon a contrary conclusion, as it was. Assuming that the facts in evidence, other than that involved in the appeal, warranted submission of the case to the jury (and the case was argued and heard upon such assumption), it should have been so submitted.
However, as this law continued to evolve, proof of a statutory violation was not an automatic "slam dunk" for a plaintiff.  In Coward v. Borden Foods, Inc., 267 S.C. 423, 229 S.E.2d 262 (1976), the plaintiff bit into something hard in a pack of Cracker Jacks and brought suit for negligent manufacture and violation of the applicable Food and Cosmetic Act at the time.  At trial, the court granted the defendant's motion for non-suit because there was no proof of negligence at common law or under the applicable Act.  Id. at 425, 229 S.E.2d at 263.  On appeal, the plaintiff admitted there was no proof of negligence but (again) cited to violation of the Act as per se negligence.  Id.  In this case, the court affirmed the trial court based on the evidence. 
In brief, the testimony presented by appellant was simply that, while driving and eating popcorn, she bit a hard unidentified object or substance, causing pain, and subsequently she found that the tooth was cracked. The dentist could not determine from an examination of the tooth what caused it to crack but, based upon the statements of appellant, he was of the opinion that the break was caused by the tooth striking some hard object. It was inferable that no foreign object could have gotten into the box of popcorn after it was opened by appellant.
Id. at 426, 229 S.C. at 264.  Based on this lack of evidence, there was no testimony to show that plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by an adulteration of the Cracker Jacks.  Id. at 427, 229 S.C. at 264.

Finally, Creach v. Sara Lee Corp., 331 S.C. 461, 502 S.E.2d 923 (1998) involved a plaintiff who bit into a biscuit that appeared to have gravel or rock in it.  She sued for negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability and was awarded $60,000 (against Sara Lee) and $7,600 (against co-defendant Western Steer).  Id. at 463, 502 S.E.2d at 923-24.  Sara Lee appealed and argued that the plaintiff received a triple recovery against it on all three causes of action and should have been forced to elect remedies.  Id. at 463-64, 502 S.E.2d at 924.  The court affirmed the trial court because (1) Sara Lee did not object to the jury charges or verdict form, and (2) no election of remedies was required because only one recovery was sought and obtained.  Id. at 464, 502 S.E.2d at 924.  Sara Lee also argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the negligence cause of action. Id. The court also affirmed the trial court in reviewing this argument based on the "two issue" rule.  Id. "Pursuant to that rule, when the jury returns a general verdict involving two or more issues and its verdict is supported as to at least one issue, the appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all causes of action."  Id.  Sara Lee did not appeal the breach of warranty or strict liability issues, and the verdict was supportable by these causes of action.  Id. at 464-65, 502 S.E.2d at 924.  In a footnote, the court said that even if the "two issue" rule did not apply, it would still affirm because Sara Lee offered no evidence that the hard substance was natural to the ingredients of the finished product, and the jury could infer a lack of due care from the rock/gravel's presence.  Id. at 465, 502 S.E.2d at 924.

Wow...all of that was a mouthful...of carpet tacks, glass, steel, and rock/gravel. 

Happy Holidays!

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