Showing posts with label Punitive Damages. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Punitive Damages. Show all posts

Friday, June 29, 2012

New SC Products Liability Decision: Keeter v. Alpine Towers, Int'l

This week, the South Carolina Court of Appeals released its opinion in Keeter v. Alpine Towers International, Inc.  You can find the decision here on page 72 and here.  As you may recall, I blogged about this jury verdict back on June 22, 2009.  (See this post for more information about the verdict).  There is some very important information in this case on how to properly structure a verdict form in a products liability case.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiff Larry Keeter (“Keeter”) fell more than twenty feet from a climbing tower to the ground.  He was seventeen at the time, broke a vertebra, and was rendered a permanent paraplegic.  Alpine Towers (“AT”) originally sold the climbing tower to an amusement park.  Keeter’s high school purchased the tower from the park and hired AT to move it, install it, and train high school faculty to safely use it.  The sale contract identified AT as the “seller.”  The tower’s central safety feature was a “belay system” which utilized four participants and system of pullies to control the ascent/descent of a climber.  As Keeter was climbing, the rope in the belay system became tight.  When someone assisting (the “belayer”) tried to free the rope, she lost the assistance of the belay device, could not control the rope, and Keeter fell. 

PROCEDURE: Keeter and his parents sued for (1) strict liability; (2) negligent design of the climbing tower, and (3) negligence in failing to properly train high school faculty.  (A copy of the Amended Complaint can be found here).  Plaintiffs also filed suit against the belayer for negligence.  Plaintiffs settled with the high school before filing suit and dismissed the belayer before trial.  The jury returned a verdict on each cause of action.  It awarded $500 for strict liability, $900,000 in actual damages and $160,000 in punitive damages for negligent design, and $2,500,000 in actual damages and $950,000 in punitive damages for AT’s negligence in training the high school’s faculty.  The jury also returned a verdict for Keeter’s parents for $240,000 in actual damages.  After hearing post-trial motions, the court required Keeter to elect between his causes of action and ordered that the high school’s settlement be set off against Keeter’s recovery.  Keeter filed a motion requesting the court to enter a cumulative amount rather than requiring him to elect, and the court denied the motion.  The court entered judgment for $2,500,000 in actual damages and $950,000 in punitive damages on the negligent training cause of action.  Both Plaintiffs and AT appealed.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the trial court was in error in denying AT’s directed verdict, post-trial, and new trial motions, including the sufficiency of evidence for all causes of action, whether the chain of causation was broken by intervening and superseding negligent acts, the sufficiency of evidence for punitive damages, and apportionment of fault; and (2) whether the trial court erred in treating Plaintiffs’ verdicts as “three awards” and requiring him to elect his remedy.

DISPOSITION: The South Carolina Court of Appeals (1) affirmed denial of AT’s motions, and (2) reversed the trial court’s interpretation of the jury verdict and remanded with instructions that it enter judgment in Keeter’s favor against AT for $3,400,500 in actual damages and $1,100,000 in punitive damages.

RULES AND OPINION: The first half of the opinion addresses AT’s appeal, which is summarized as follows:

  • Strict Liability – There was sufficient evidence that a reasonable alternative design would have prevented Keeter’s fall.  The tower incorporated a device called “Trango Jaws” in the belay system, which relied on the absence of human error to safely belay a climber.  Plaintiff’s experts introduced evidence that a device called a “GriGri” would automatically stop the rope if the belayer lost control and not rely on the absence of human error. 

  • Negligent Design – There was sufficient evidence to support a negligent design theory.  Plaintiffs relied on the failure to incorporate the GriGri for this theory, but Plaintiffs also introduced evidence that AT conducted a ten-year study that the majority of accidents on climbing towers resulted from human error and belayers dropping climbers.  Despite this information, AT did not design for human error by incorporating a locking device.  Plaintiff also introduced evidence of breach duty of reasonable care in designing warnings and instructions for the tower.  AT omitted an instruction to have someone within reaching distance of active belay ropes and beside the climber.  There also should have been end user warnings for first-time climbers and belayers.

  • Negligent Training – AT did not provide certain materials to high school faculty that it used in other training sessions (i.e., a syllabus).  AT also did not teach faculty supervisors to stand directly behind a belayer and to assist students in avoiding errors.  AT also did not teach the high school to test students’ competency before allowing them to belay a climber.  Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a negligent training theory.

  • Intervening Causation – “’For an intervening act to break the causal link and insulate the tortfeasor from further liability, the intervening act must be unforeseeable.’”  (Quoting McKnight v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 385 S.C. 380, 387, 684 S.E.2d 566, 569 (Ct. App. 2009)).  There was ample evidence to support that the actions of the high school and belayer were foreseeable, and therefore the chain of causation was not broken to insulate AT from liability.  AT knew the high school would be using students as belayers, and their ten-year study informed them of the human error risks.  The same human error that resulted in Keeter’s injury was not only foreseeable by AT, it was actually foreseen.

  • Punitive Damages – With regard to Plaintiffs’ claim that AT recklessly designed the tower, there was evidence that AT knew the majority of falls were caused by human error, could have used an alternative design to account for human error, and the cost of the alternative design was inconsequential.  Therefore, this was evidence that AT was “conscious of the probability of resulting injury” from its negligence, and therefore reckless.  With regard to Plaintiffs’ claim that AT was reckless in failing to properly train high school faculty, there was sufficient evidence that AT knew the high school would use student belayers and that they were less attentive and more susceptible to error.  Nevertheless, AT still failed to properly train faculty, did not include certain materials in their training processes, removed certain instructions about where to stand in relation to a climber, failed to teach competency testing, and did not inform the high school of the option of using the GriGri.  This was sufficient evidence of recklessness.

  • Apportionment of Fault – Because of the court’s ruling on punitive damages, it was unnecessary to address the issue of apportionment of fault because the apportionment statute “does not apply to a defendant whose conduct is determined to be . . . reckless.”  (Quoting S.C. Code § 15-38-15(F)).

The second half of the opinion addresses Plaintiffs’ appeal and election of remedies.  “’Election of remedies involves a choice between different forms of redress afforded by law for the same injury . . . . It is the act of choosing between inconsistent remedies allowed by law on the same set of facts.’” (Quoting Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 218, 479 S.E.2d 35, 44-45 (1996)).  The court pointed out that Keeter asserted three causes of action, but sought only one remedy, i.e., “damages.”  “When a plaintiff seeks only one remedy, there is nothing to elect.”  Therefore, the court held the doctrine of election of remedies did not apply.  The doctrine applies to election of “remedies” and not election of “verdicts.”  The court cited to Creach v. Sara Lee Corp., 331 S.C. 461, 502 S.E.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1998) as support (and you can see a short summary of that case in this post).

However, the court also cited to the importance of not allowing a double recovery.  To prevent a double recovery, the court must interpret the verdict to determine the jury’s intent.  The court concluded the trial court erred in its interpretation of the verdict to be “three awards” and therefore “inconsistent.”  The error arose with the jury form, which you can find here.  The verdict form was correct in that it required the jury to write its verdict for each cause of action.  However, because Keeter only sought one remedy – damages – and because that remedy could not vary from one cause of action to another, the trial court should have required the jury to write one amount for the damages (and not separate amounts for each cause of action).  “The use of three blanks for damages in the verdict form left the verdict ambiguous as to the amount of damages the jury intended to award.”  To determine the jury’s intent in an ambiguous verdict, the court should consider the entire proceedings to determine what the jury intended.  In reviewing the record, the jury appeared to intend to award a cumulative amount, and it is the duty of the court to sustain verdicts when a logical reason for reconciling them can be found.  Therefore the court found the jury intended the verdicts to be added together for a total verdict in Keeter’s favor of $3,400,500 actual damages and $1,100,000 in punitive damages. 

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Thursday, February 9, 2012

South Carolina's Tort Reform Statute Became Effective January 1, 2012

This post is about 40 days late, and I meant to post it earlier.  However, between discussing food liability over the holidays and getting busy, it went by the wayside.

South Carolina's tort reform statute became effective on January 1, 2012. From reviewing my Google Analytics daily report, there is a great deal of interest in what the statute means to South Carolina litigation in the future.  There have been quite a few keyword searches about tort reform that brought readers to my blog.

So without further delay, let do a quick summary of what the South Carolina Fairness in Civil Justice Act means.  I have done extensive previous blogging about the legislative process that brought about the Act, and you can find those posts here, here, here, here, here, and here.  The final version of the Act can be found here. 

In a nutshell, here is what the Act changes about South Carolina litigation:
  • A claim for punitive damages has to be specifically prayed for in the Complaint.  It does not have to be a specific amount, but the plaintiff has to plead them as part of the relief being sought.  S.C. Code § 15-32-510.
  • If requested by a defendant, all actions involving punitive damages must be conducted in a bifurcated trial before the same jury.  The first stage of the trial is limited to assessment of liability, and punitive damages evidence is not admissible at this stage.  Punitive damages can be considered if nominal or compensatory damages are awarded in the first stage.  In the second stage, punitive damages may be awarded only if the plaintiff proves willful, wanton, or reckless conduct by the defendant by clear and convincing evidence.  There is a long list of factors that the jury can consider in determining the amount of punitive damages.  If punitive damages are awarded, the trial court reviews the award to ensure it is not excessive.  In a case with multiple defendants, a punitive damages award must be specific to each defendant, and the defendant is only liable for that amount.  See generally S.C. Code § 15-32-520, and see subsection (E) for the list of factors considered (e.g., degree of culpability, severity of harm, etc.).
  • S.C. Code § 15-32-530 sets forth the caps on punitive damages.  Generally, punitive damages may not exceed the greater of three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to each claimant, or $500,000.  This limit cannot be disclosed to the jury.  If the amount returned is greater than the cap, then the trial court has to assess whether the wrongful conduct was motivated primarily by unreasonable financial gain and was known by a policy decision-maker or whether the defendant's actions could subject the defendant to conviction of a felony and the conduct and was the proximate cause of plaintiff's damages.  If so, then the "cap" becomes four times the compensatory damages or $2 million, whichever is greater.  If not, then the amount is reduced to the initial cap (three times compensatory damages or $500,000).  However, as Billy Mays once said, "But wait, there's more!"  That's not the end of the loopholes in the "cap."  If the trial court determines (1) there was an intent to harm by the defendant, and harm in fact, (2) the defendant pled guilty to or has been convicted of a felony concerning the same act or course of conduct that proximately caused plaintiff's injury, or (3) the defendant's actions were while under the influence of some sort of drug or alcohol....then "POOF"...the cap goes away.  The State Budget and Control Board can adjust these limits each year to factor in changes to the Consumer Price Index.  Finally, remedies under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act are exempt from this article.  If you really want to understand how all of this works, read S.C. Code § 15-32-530 in its entirety.
  • A circuit solicitor can now employ outside counsel without the approval of the Attorney General for civil forfeiture proceedings arising from criminal activity or from estreatment of bail bonds.  Other matters require written approval by the Attorney General.  S.C. Code § 1-7-750.
  • There are some new provisions about automobile insurers providing coverage information upon request from a claimant.  My colleague Jack Griffeth blogged about this portion of the law at the South Carolina Insurance Law Blog, and you can find his post here.  The statute can be found at S.C. Code § 38-77-250.
  • I do not do construction law, but if you do, you need to check out S.C. Code § 15-3-670.  In it, you will find there are some limitations on actions based on unsafe or defective improvements to real property, evidence of fraud, negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness.  The statute also takes away the eight year statute of limitations in cases of personal injury or death.
  • Finally, S.C. Code § 18-9-130(A)(1) is amended to include some new limitations on appeal bonds.  In short, the execution of a judgment is not stayed pending appeal unless the presiding judge grants a stay of execution.  Furthermore, if a stay is granted and a bond is required, the bond should not exceed the amount of judgment or (a) $25 million, whichever is less, for a business with greater than 50 employees and $5 million in gross revenue for the previous tax year, or (b) $1 million, whichever is less, for all other entities or individuals.
Those are all of the statutes implicated by the Act.  It will be interesting to see how they affect the administration of trials in South Carolina. 

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Friday, December 23, 2011

Holiday Season Food Law (Part III): The fly in the soft drink cases.



 (This is the third post in my holiday series in which I am surveying South Carolina's products liability case law involving food/beverage.  See also part I and part II). 

I was just a young'un when the Christmas version of Coca-Cola's "Hilltop" commercial came out.  You know the one I am talking about (above).  When I hear those children of the 70s croon that they would like to buy the world a Coke, it evokes memories of me tearing into my Evel Knievel motorcycle or my Stretch Monster on Christmas morning.  (Thanks Mom and Dad!).

But I digress.  As nostalgic as the commercial is, it is also appropriate for another group of cases in South Carolina, e.g., where a plaintiff sips that carbonated, caramel-colored goodness and also gets a mouthful of yellow jacket, fly, or other previously living thing.  Which brings us to our next bucket of cases for survey...

♪ ♫  On the third day of Christmas, my true love gave to me...A SOFT DRINK WITH A DEAD ANIMAL IN IT! ♪ ♫

On August 14, 1930, the South Carolina Supreme Court filed three similar cases involving a dead something-or-other in a bottle: Tate v. Mauldin, 157 S.C. 392, 154 S.E. 431 (1930) (dead rat/mouse carcas), Culbertson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 157 S.C. 352, 154 S.E. 424 (1930) (dead yellow jacket), and Burnette v. Augusta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 157 S.C. 359, 154 S.E. 645 (1930) (dead "bug").  Tate appears to be the foundation of South Carolina's food products liability law and is the earliest "dead animal in a bottle case."  In Tate, the South Carolina Supreme Court set forth the fundamental principles of South Carolina's food law.  See generally 154 at S.E. 433-34.  The courts in Culbertson and Burnette then cited to Tate as support for their holdings.   

Culbertson is the most interesting of these three cases.  In Culbertson, a man took a drink of Coke and ingested a dead yellow jacket.  154 S.E. at 425.  At trial, he argued the defendant bottling company was negligent in bottling the beverage and failed to properly inspect it.  Id.  The jury awarded him $200 (which, by the way, is $2,586 by today's dollars according to this website).  On appeal, the defendant argued the trial judge should have directed a verdict because it claimed there was no evidence to support the product was sold by the defendant.  Id.  The court denied this argument based on testimony from a retail employee that the beverage at issue was purchased from the defendant.  Id.  Defendant also argued that the real reason plaintiff became sick was because he drank some whiskey to relieve his condition.  Id.  The court denied this argument because there was testimony that the whiskey was actually ingested after emitting the yellow jacket, and whether the whiskey or yellow jacket made the man sick was a jury question.  Id.  Finally, the appellate court affirmed the jury charges used by the trial court and affirmed that there was sufficient evidence of negligence to submit the case to the jury.  Id.

Floyd v. Florence Nehi Bottling Co, 188 S.C., 98, 198 S.E. 161 (1938) involved a plaintiff who swallowed dead flies in a bottle of Orange Crush.  The jury awarded $1,000 to the plaintiff at trial.  198 S.E. at 162.  The court stated that injury alone is not proof of negligence.  Id. at 163.  Instead, the plaintiff has the burden of proving negligence through direct or circumstantial evidence.  Id.  There was evidence that the bottler's inspector "inspected" 30 bottles per minute, or 14,000 bottles per day.  The jury was entitled to consider whether or not this was the proper level of care in the inspection process.  Id.  The court ultimately affirmed the judgment.  Id. at 164.

In Hobbs v. Carolina Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 194 S.C. 543, 10 S.E.2d 25 (1940), a man bought a Coke and drank about one-fourth of it before realizing that there was some "vile...poisonous...polluted...foul...contaminated...revolting substance" therein, resembling decomposed cockroaches or other bugs.  10 S.E.2d at 26.  He became sick and sued for damages.  Id.  At trial, the jury awarded the man $350, and the defendant bottling company appealed.  Id.  Instead of focusing on negligence, this case really focuses on special damages.  Id. at 27-28.  The plaintiff claimed at trial that he had to hire someone to do work that he otherwise would have done but for his sickness, and he presented the amount paid for the work as "damages" to the jury.  Id. at 27.  The defendant objected on grounds that the plaintiff had not pled these special damages in his Complaint.  Id.  The appellate court agreed with the defendant, and it reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 28.  "[W]here damages do not necessarily result from the act complained of, and consequently are not implied by law, the plaintiff must state the particular damage sustained to in order to introduce testimony in regard to it.  The rule is to avoid surprise."  Id. at 27.  Even though there was sufficient evidence to show violation of the applicable food statute in effect at the time (constituting negligence per se), there had to be a new trial because of the admission of the evidence of special damages that had not been pled in the Complaint.  Id. at 28-29.

Finally, Cohen v. Allendale Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 291 S.C. 35, 351 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1987) involves similar facts (also involving an insect).  The jury awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in actual damages and $1,000 in punitive damages.  Id. at 37, 351 S.E.2d at 898.  The defendant bottling company appealed the trial court's failure to direct a verdict in its favor or grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Id.  First, the defendant claimed there was evidence to support  the insect came to be in the bottle after plaintiff opened the drink in his office.  Id. at 37, 351 S.E.2d at 899.  Second, the defendant claimed there was no direct evidence of any negligent act or omission during the bottling and inspection process.  Id.  The court concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to reasonably find the insect was in the bottle prior to the plaintiff opening it (e.g., the insect was at the bottom of the bottle and not floating, it was decomposed, and it happened on a day when plaintiff had not observed insects in his office).  Id.  Once the court admitted evidence showing the insect was in the bottle before opening it, plaintiff had also presented evidence of negligence.  Id. at 39, 351 S.E.2d at 899.  The court also believed the facts were sufficient to send the case to the jury on a breach of warranty theory.  Id.  "The presence of the insect in the bottle was evidence from which the jury could find [defendant] had breached its implied warranty that the soft drink was fit for ordinary consumption."  Id. 

However, a second issue in Cohen was whether the verdict was excessive in light of the facts.  Id. at 39, 351 S.E.2d at 899-900.  The plaintiff's only proven out-of-pocket damages were four or five dollars for prescription nausea medicine.  Id.  He had no doctor bills, lost wages, or physical impairment.  Id. at 39, 351 S.E.2d at 900.  The court set forth the following as the applicable rule:
In a personal injury case, the amount to be awarded for the injury and any resulting pain and suffering cannot be determined with mathematical precision and is necessarily a matter of judgment on the facts of each case which must be left to the jury's discretion.  Where the amount of the verdict bears a reasonable relationship to the character and extent of the injury and the damage sustained, it is not excessive.
Id. at 40, 351 S.E.2d at 900.  The court agreed that the award of actual damages may have been liberal, but it could not conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, or that the award bore no rational to the evidence presented.  Id.  However, the court reversed the award of punitive damages.  Id.  For recovery of punitive damages, there must be evidence that a defendant's conduct is wilful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.  Id.  The court noted that punitive damages involve deliberate intention or present consciousness of wrongdoing, and there was no evidence that the defendant intended to furnish the plaintiff with a soft drink containing an insect.  Id. at 40-41, 351 S.E.2d at 900.  Therefore, the court ruled that the punitive damages award should have been set aside by the trial court and reversed the award.

So...I'd like to teach the world to sing, in perfect harmony . . . I'd like to buy the world a Coke, and keep it free from...bees.

Happy Holidays All!

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Thursday, July 28, 2011

South Carolina Tort Reform: Governor Nikki Haley Signs Bill Capping Punitive Damages Into Law

On Tuesday, Governor Nikki Haley signed into law the tort reform bill passed by the South Carolina State Legislature earlier this year.  The bill includes numerous provisions relating to punitive damages that I blogged about as it was debated earlier this year.  The Charleston Regional Business Journal did a nice write-up yesterday about the signing of the bill and impressions of the bill by members of the South Carolina business community.  The article can be found online here, and a cut and paste is below.

Haley signs tort reform law, creating punitive damages cap

By James T. Hammond
jhammond@scbiznews.com
Published July 27, 2011

Gov. Nikki Haley signed changes to South Carolina civil litigation laws on Tuesday, including a $2 million cap on punitive damages that she said was long overdue.

According to the S.C. Chamber of Commerce, which had sought the changes, the new law includes a cap on punitive damages modeled after the state of Florida. The legislation caps punitive damages greater than $500,000 or three times the compensatory damages awarded.

However, if the court finds a defendant is motivated primarily by financial gain or a defendant’s actions rise to the level of felony charges, then the award can be in­creased to the greater of $2 million or four times compensatory damages.

If it is proven the defendant intended to harm the claim­ant, was convicted of a felony arising out of the same act or acted under the influence of drugs or alcohol, there is no cap for punitive damages.

S.C. Chamber of Commerce President Otis Rawl said passage of the tort reform law was his organization’s No. 1 priority this year. The changes in the law were not everything the chamber wanted, Rawl said, but he added that the legislation was a good compromise.

“We were the only state in the Southeast without a punitive damages cap,” said Rawl, adding that until now, that status had been a competitive disadvantage in recruiting new businesses to the state.

Haley agreed that the lack of such a provision hurt recruiting of industries.

“It automatically became a topic of conversation,” Haley said. “This was very simple. This was a vote either for business or for trial lawyers.”

Haley said tort reform remains a work in progress. She wants provisions added to the law that would require losers in civil litigation to pay the costs of the trial.

She said she thinks the changes create a “fair balance in our state,” while still permitting citizens their day in court.

Harry Lightsey, a Columbia attorney who worked for passage of the civil litigation changes, said the tort reform bill was the culmination of efforts that began in 2003.

“In 2003, Hampton County was recognized as a litigation hell hole,” Lightsey said, referring to a South Carolina county that had become notorious for its generous civil lawsuit awards to plaintiffs.

“Businesses large and small came together to change that,” Lightsey said, adding, “the governor was the difference-maker this year.”

Haley also said the new law represented a just compromise between two extremes.

“The House had a $350,000 cap on punitive damages. I’d like to have seen that happen,” Haley said. “But the original Senate version had no cap at all.”

Louis Gossett, president of the S.C. Manufacturers Alliance, said tort reform remains a work in progress.

“We’re always going to be working on this,” Gossett said. “We’d like loser-pay. What tort reform is about is certainty; it’s about stability. There is a place for litigation in our society. But there must be consequences for frivolous acts.”

As far as who decides what is frivolous, Gossett said, “That’s a good question. Probably the General Assembly and the courts.”

South Carolina Tort Reform: Quotation in South Carolina Lawyers Weekly Article








I did numerous blog entries earlier this year about my involvment in South Carolina's debate and passage of tort reform in the General Assembly.  I failed to blog about it, but I was recently quoted in South Carolina Lawyers Weekly about the bill that was ultimately passed.  My colleague at Collins & Lacy, P.C., Gray Culbreath, was also quoted.  A cut and paste of the article is below.

Not all tort-related wishes come true 

by Caitlin Coakley

Published: July 1st, 2011

Looking back on the past legislative session, attorneys mostly see just one bill: HB 3375, the S.C. Fairness in Civil Justice Act – commonly called the tort reform bill.

Pushed by business groups and conservatives in the legislature, the bill imposes caps on punitive damages to be awarded in tort cases, with some exceptions. It gave Mike Hemlepp, executive director of the South Carolina Association for Justice, a big case of heartburn. As part of an organization that represents trial lawyers, Hemlepp said that he and his group are, on principal, opposed to tort reform and caps of any kind.

“We trust juries,” he said. “Anything that interferes with a jury’s ability to make a judgment, we are opposed to it.”

But with the bill signed into law, Hemlepp is less venomous and more resigned to the new laws. Despite his fundamental opposition to the goal of the bill, he recognizes that the lawyers his organization represents could have gotten off a lot worse.

On the other side of the issue, the defense attorneys say the new law is a good start, but wasn’t as effective as it could have been. Gray Culbreath, president of the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys’ Association, said that the bill is a good one, “as a matter of perspective.”

“We have caps now, and we didn’t have any before,” he said. “There is a belief that something’s better than nothing.”

Those mixed feelings are perhaps a reflection of the compromise between the bill introduced in the House of Representatives and the bill that passed the Senate. The House’s original hill was much stricter: a $350,000 across-the-board cap on punitive damages with no exemptions.

But by the time the bill hit the governor’s desk, the punitive-damage caps were more fluid: $500,000 or no more than three times the compensatory damages for most cases, rising to $2 million or four times compensatory damages in cases where the jury ruled that the business or person cut corners in order to rake in an unreasonable profit or if the defendant, business or individual, committed a felony in the process. If the defendant is actually convicted of a felony, caused harm intentionally, or was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the case is exempted from caps altogether.

The amending and softening that the bill underwent while making its way through the legislative chambers made it into something that Hemlepp begrudgingly admits isn’t too bad.

“I think the legislature did a very good job of educating themselves on something that was very complicated,” he said. “We don’t believe in caps of any kind, but what was passed in this bill is reasonable compared to other states.”

But defense attorneys like Culbreath can’t help but lament some of the things that it left out.

One provision included in the original bill would have overturned a South Carolina statute that disallows information about whether the plaintiff in an automobile accident was wearing a seatbelt.

In the Senate, that provision was taken out, but Culbreath said that the some trucking and manufacturing associations to whom he had spoken have said they wished it had been retained.

Brian Comer, a Columbia attorney who worked with the legislature on the proposed product liability aspects of the bill, also acknowledged that the bill has been watered down from its original form. However, he adds that if the alternative would be to not have anything pass, the new law is enough.

“It’s a compromise,” he said. “It does some good things, there are some things that could have been done, but overall there was something done.” In fact, Comer was happy that  he and other product liability attorneys were successful in keeping the bill from being watered down any further.

The legislature briefly considered adding an amendment that would overturn the August 2010 ruling in Branham v. Ford Motor Co., which created the “feasible design” standard: In cases that alleged a company created a defective product, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the company could feasibly have manufactured a safer product.

Had the case been overturned, the plaintiff would only have to prove that the product did not live up to consumer expectations.

Comer said that the issue is one that deserves another look, but should be considered as a separate issue and not as an amendment to a larger bill.

“We aren’t necessarily averse to doing that, but it needs to come at the end of a debate involving members of bar and academic community,” he said. “It shouldn’t be something that happens at the eleventh hour.”

Even Hemlepp acknowledges that the bill wasn’t completely devastating to trial lawyers. The SCAJ successfully added a provision to the bill that prohibits award caps from being disclosed to the jury. By keeping the jury in the dark as to the award caps, it left the jurors to determine what a fair award would be. Under the bill, if the jury’s punitive damage award exceeds the cap, the plaintiff would get the maximum amount allowed by law.

C. Stuart Mauney, a defense trial lawyer in Greenville, said that even if the bill wasn’t everything the business community hoped for, it accomplished the ultimate goal of sending the message that South Carolina was making an effort to become more business friendly.

Having the caps in place, Mauney said, “creates a more positive business climate. When executives make decisions about whether or not to do business in South Carolina, they make the decisions in part based on the state’s lawsuit environment.”

But Terry Haselden, a Spartanburg attorney who handles tort cases, said the bill isn’t good for much else. He calls it a “feel-good bill” that lawmakers can crow about to constituents but doesn’t have much practical impact, since “punitive damages are extremely rare in South Carolina.”

The cases where the cap will come into play, he said, will be the most tragic ones where people are most severely hurt and the jury believes that the plaintiff deserves a higher sum – in other words, he said, the ones that deserve it the most.

“Juries in South Carolina are extremely conservative,” he said. “They rarely award punitive damages unless there’s a darn good reason.”

Friday, June 3, 2011

SC House Agrees to Amended Tort Reform Bill

I received word yesterday that the house passed the amended tort reform bill by a vote of 99-16.  The State Newspaper has a short write-up about it here, and cut and pasted below.

House agrees to amended tort reform bill

 
House members agreed to Senate amendments Thursday on a tort reform bill.

Under the measure, punitive awards would be limited to $500,000 or three times the actual damages, whichever is greater.

In the worst cases, punitive awards would be capped at the greater of $2 million or four times the actual damages, which includes things like lost wages and medical expenses. 

The House vote signals a victory for Gov. Nikki Haley who made tort reform one of her priorities this session.

Wednesday, June 1, 2011

Update on South Carolina Tort Reform, Punitive Damages Caps, Etc.

I have previously blogged about tort reform efforts in the South Carolina General Assembly this year.  (See prior posts here and here for context).  This issue has been consuming a great deal of my time in the last couple of months, and it seemed to be an appropriate time to provide an update.

As you may recall, there was an effort brewing to legislatively overturn Branham v. Ford Motor Co.  Some members of the Legislature viewed the case as judicial activism and a movement away from the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which have been codified at S.C. Code § 15-73-30 as the legislative intent of South Carolina's Defective Products Act .  The first effort to overturn the case came in the form of a "renewal" of sorts of South Carolina's Defective Products Act.  Basically, the amendment to the tort reform bill was to strike the prior act (S.C. Code §§ 15-73-10, 20, and 30), and then renew it in identical form as S.C. Code §§ 15-73-11, 21, and 31.  The rationale behind this amendment was that by renewing the statute, the Legislature would re-affirm that South Carolina follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and not the Restatement (Third) (as suggested by the court in Branham).

After the initial amendment to renew the language of the Defective Products Act, the focus shifted.  Instead of renewing the language, the effort shifted toward a dialogue about adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts as South Carolina's products liability law.  Therefore, over the last couple of weeks, I have spent a substantial amount of time drafting papers on what the court did in Branham, options for compromise, distinctions between the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third), and what other states have done with regard to adopting either of them. 

In short, my research revealed that although there are some worthwhile provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, this is not something (in my opinion) that South Carolina should do "on the fly," by amendment, and toward the end of a legislative session.  If we are going to talk about substantial changes to the products liability law in South Carolina, this blogger's opinion is that it should take the form of a separate bill and should involve debate and input from members of the bar who practice in this area.  Adopting the Restatement (Third) would change South Carolina's products liability law overnight.  As a lifelong South Carolinian, I can say (with pride) that we do not do anything very quickly.  Adopting the Restatement (Third) should not be an exception based on the differences between it and current South Carolina law.  I welcome your comments on this issue.

After spending yesterday at the Legislature with my colleague Gray Culbreath, President of the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys' Association, we learned that the effort to overturn Branham no longer appears to be a focus of the tort reform bill.  Instead, the focus is on capping punitive damages, and there is no language to adopt the Restatement (Third) or to overturn Branham.  The most current form of the bill, as given second reading by the Senate yesterday evening, can be found at the following link:

http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess119_2011-2012/prever/3375_20110531.htm

My understanding is that the provisions relating to the capping of punitive damages are based in large part on a Florida statute, with some variations.  Because I have been focused on the Branham issue, I have not fully analyzed the punitive damages provisions.  However, a quick review reveals that the bill provides for bifurcation of trials where punitive damages are at issue and a cap on punitive damages of the greater of three times the amount of compensatory damages or $500,000.  However, there are some exceptions in the bill that either increase this cap or remove it altogether, based on certain conduct.   

There is an article in The State today about the Senate's debate and the current status.  You can find it here, and cut and pasted below.

Senate caps lawsuit awards

-  joconnor@thestate.com
The South Carolina Senate agreed to limit lawsuit awards Tuesday, ending years of debate about whether to make the state legal system more business-friendly.

The bill would create a tiered system of damages based upon the degree of negligence or criminal behavior involved. Most lawsuits would cap punitive damages at $500,000, or three times actual costs, whichever is greater.

But that cap rises to $2 million, or four times actual damages, under several circumstances, including if an injury resulted because of an unreasonable profit-based decision or if the person or business that caused the injury was subject to a felony conviction.
gavel        The cap is lifted entirely if the person or business that caused the injury is convicted of a felony, intended to harm or was under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

The vote knocks out a key issue pushed by Senate Republican leadership, Gov. Nikki Haley and business interests in the session’s final week. The bill heads back to the House, which approved a $350,000 cap, or three times actual damages, with no exemptions earlier this year.

Business groups noted the caps are still among the highest in the Southeast, but they supported the compromise.

“It’s a decent day’s work,” said Rick Scott, president of the South Carolina Trucking Association. “This puts us close to being competitive; … it is a move forward.”

Attorneys said despite debating the need for years, the bill addressed a problem which did not exist.

“We still do not believe there is a need to put caps on punitive damages,” said Mark Joye with the South Carolina Association for Justice.

The bill has churned in the Senate for weeks as others issues, such as the budget, took precedence and those who opposed the caps sought to avoid a vote. But Haley and the state Republican Party dialed up the pressure Tuesday, with the governor insisting on the House version of the bill and telling lawmakers she would include their vote on her end-of-session report cards.

Lawmakers huddled all day, but it took a late afternoon five-minute recess that stretched more than three hours for the two sides to finally parse the bill’s language. Business lobbyists huddled near the House chamber poring over the latest revision, while lobbyists for trial lawyers did the same thing across the lobby.

Senators shuttled back and forth between the two groups with the others’ thoughts.

The bill now heads back for the House to agree or disagree with the Senate version. In a letter to Senators Tuesday, Haley said she supports the House version of the bill. If the House insists on its version, House and Senate lawmakers will have to work out a compromise.

“We got as good a bill as we can under the circumstances,” said Sen. Gerald Malloy, D-Darlington and an opponent of the caps. “We need to lean on the Senate to try to maintain the Senate position.
Reach O’Connor at (803) 771-8358
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Monday, May 16, 2011

Case Brief: Rhodes v. McDonald

Rhodes v. McDonald, 345 S.C. 500, 548 S.E.2d 220 (Ct. App. 2001), involves the installation of vinyl siding.  It stands for the principle that a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages in a breach of warranty action.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Defendant Bill Gillespie ("Gillespie") owned and operated an insulation company, Defendant Southern Insulation ("SI").  345 S.C. at 502, 548 S.E.2d at 221.  Plaintiffs contracted with SI to install vinyl siding on their mobile home and extend the room over their kitchen.  Id.  After installation, plaintiffs complained that the siding was "wavy looking."  Id.  Despite assurances that it would "settle down," it became worse and began pulling apart.  Id.  It also led to the roof "bowing up."  Id.

PROCEDURE: Plaintiffs brought an action against defendants for breach of contract and breach of certain implied warranties.  345 S.C. at 501, 548 S.E.2d at 221.  A jury awarded plaintiffs $11,464.50 in actual damages and $27,500 in punitive damages.  Id. at 503, 548 S.E.2d at 221.  Defendants appealed. 

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant defendants' motions for directed verdict (1) as to Gillespie's individual liability and (2) as to the availability of punitive damages in the breach of contract and breach of implied warranty causes of action.  345 S.C. at 501, 548 S.E.2d at 221.  Defendants also contended that the trial court erred in submitting an improper special verdict form to the jury.  Id.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed with regard to individual liability of Gillespie.  Reversed with regard to award of punitive damages.    The special interrogatories question was not preserved for appeal (and moot in light of the punitive damages reversal).

OPINION: With regard to the availability of punitive damages, the court agreed that the trial court should not have submitted this issue to the jury.  345 S.C. at 503-05, 548 S.E.2d at 221-23.  The measure of damages that a buyer may recover under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") is set forth at S.C. Code sections 36-2-714 and 715.  Id. at 503, 548 S.E.2d at 222.  The court reviewed the wording of both statutes and concluded that the plain language of the statutes indicated intent by the legislature to limit damages recoverable for breach of warranty to actual, incidental, and consequential damages.  Id. at 503-04, 548 S.E.2d at 221-22.  There was no provision for punitive damages in either statute.  Id.  This is further supported by S.C. Code section 36-1-106(1), which provides, in part, that "neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in the act or by other rule of law."  Id. at 505, 548 S.E.2d at 222.  Again, the court pointed out that the UCC does not include such a provision.  Id.  Although punitive damages are allowed in South Carolina in a breach of contract action where the breach is accompanied by a fraudulent act, there was no such evidence in the case.  Id. at 505, 548 S.E.2d at 222-23.

With regard to the trial court's failure to direct a verdict for Gillespie as to his individual liability, the court disagreed.  Id. at 505, 548 S.E.2d at 223.  SI was not incorporated at the time of the contract, and the general rule is that owners of unincorporated companies are not entitled to the same protection as owners of incorporated entities.  Id.

Finally, the court held that defendants had not adequately preserved their argument relating to the trial court's submission of special interrogatories to the jury.  Id. at 506, 548 S.E.2d at 223.  Therefore, the court did not address this issue, but also pointed out that it was moot in light of the reversal of the punitive damages award.

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Friday, February 25, 2011

Something is afoot at the Legislature...(Update on Branham v. Ford and Proposed Punitive Damages Cap)

I have been hearing for awhile that there is a chance that the South Carolina State Legislature may take action in response to the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Branham v. Ford, and these rumors (may have been) confirmed today.

Apparently Senator Brad Hutto has offered an amendment to repeal the holding in the case. I say "may have been" above because I have not obtained a copy of the amendment, but the South Carolina Chamber of Commerce Competitiveness Update talks about this particular issue, and proposed caps on punitive damages, in today's edition. A cut and paste of the article is below (click the hyperlink above for the actual article). I will try to obtain the amendment and determine the nature of the provision.

Trial Lawyers Take Tort Reform Hostage

Last week, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee passed a comprehensive tort reform bill supported by the business community. However, this week the full Senate Judiciary Committee watered down key pieces of tort reform, including a meaningful punitive damage cap. The subcommittee also set unreasonable monetary thresholds for the admissibility of the non-use of seat belts.

The amended bill could be debated on the Senate floor as early as next week, and the South Carolina Chamber of Commerce is asking senators to vote against the committee amendment. If the committee amendment is defeated, the bill will revert back to the House-passed version of tort reform, which is a much stronger, pro-business bill championed by Speaker Bobby Harrell (Charleston).

The South Carolina Chamber and the South Carolina Civil Justice Coalition are also asking senators to examine neighboring states’ punitive damage limits, specifically Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia and Florida, and pick a model. Currently, trial lawyers are picking and choosing words and phrases from the other states in an attempt to render any cap in South Carolina meaningless.

The Chamber is also very concerned with an amendment offered by Senator Brad Hutto (Orangeburg), which was adopted by the full committee and repeals the Branham v Ford decision. The decision places South Carolina in the minority compared with other states on product liability issues. It also weakens the state’s business climate. At a time when the South Carolina Department of Commerce is working to expand the automotive cluster, this amendment must be stripped out of the tort reform bill.


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Friday, August 27, 2010

Ten Takeaways from Branham v. Ford Motor Co.

By Brian A. Comer

I'm sure many folks who have stumbled across my site as a result of the Branham v. Ford Motor Co. case are looking at the case "brief" below, and their eyes are glazing over at its sheer length. Trust me, it took awhile to digest the case and write it. So...what's the "meat of the coconut" as a former colleague of mine used to say? Here are my "Ten Takeaways from Branham v. Ford Motor Co."

(1) Where strict liability and negligence are asserted as product liability claims in South Carolina, failure to prove an element that is common to both results in a directed verdict of both. In other words, if you cannot prove the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous for one of the claims, then the other does not survive either. Although there may be circumstances where one of the claims survives, it depends on the basis of the dismissal of the other claim.

(2) There is no separate "failure to test" claim apart from the duty to design and manufacture a product that is not defective and unreasonably dangerous. (This is significant to me, as "failure to test" has become a prevalent theory, especially in drug and medical device cases).

(3) As a sports talk radio host that I listen to says, "POWWWWWWWWW!!!!"....the consumer expectations test is GONE in a South Carolina design defect case. The risk-utility test is now the exclusive test, and it requires proof of feasible alternative design. Also, in supporting this holding, the Court cited extensively to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which opens the door to its adoption in South Carolina.

(4) "The use of post-distribution evidence to evaluate a product's design through the lens of hindsight is improper." Admission of it is prejudicial.

(5) Although evidence of other incidents must be "substantially similar" and tend to prove or disprove some fact in dispute to be admissible, this issue is not even examined if the evidence is post-distribution evidence (see number 4). If it is pre-manufacture, then the Court will look at whether the data is relevant to an issue, even if the specific cause of the other incident is not known (e.g., comparative rollover data).

(6) You cannot inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury with inadmissible and prejudicial evidence in your closing argument. Period.

(7) If co-defendants are joint tortfeasors under the law, then it is improper to apportion fault on the jury form.

(8) The "harm to others" prohibition is alive and well in South Carolina when it comes to punitive damages. Trying to convince a jury that they should punish a manufacturer for all other injuries/deaths/etc. is forbidden by South Carolina and federal authority.

(9) When it comes to evidence for punitive damages, net worth is the safest harbor. Although admission of extrapolated financial data (down to hourly and daily income) has not been found to be abuse of discretion, the Court indicated there could be a limit to this kind of evidence. Furthermore, if you start getting into compensation of executives, stock options, etc., you are asking for reversal on the basis of prejudice.

(10) Courts have authority to re-align parties at any time and at their discretion.

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Tuesday, August 24, 2010

Case Brief: Branham v. Ford Motor Co.

By Brian A. Comer

Below is a case brief of the South Carolina Supreme Court's August 16, 2010 decision in Branham v. Ford Motor Co. (first posted about here). This is not that "brief," but bear in mind that the majority opinion alone is about 25 pages and will probably be the new authority on products liability law in South Carolina for years to come.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Cheryl Hale ("Hale") purchased a used 1987 Ford Bronco II 4x2 in June of 1999. The vehicle was manufactured in 1986 and had 137,500 miles on it. On June 17, 2001, Hale was driving with her child in the passenger seat and Plaintiff Jesse Branham, III ("Plaintiff") in the backseat. No one was wearing a seatbelt. Hale turned to the backseat to ask the children to quiet down. When doing this, she veered toward the shoulder of the road and the right wheel left the roadway. She responded by overcorrecting to the left. The overcorrection led to the vehicle rolling over, and Plaintiff was thrown from the vehicle and injured.

PROCEDURE: Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Ford and Hale in Hampton County. Plaintiff did not seriously pursue the case against Hale. The case against Ford was based on two product liability claims (a defective seatbelt sleeve claim and a "handling and stablility" design defect claim relating to the rollover). Both claims were pursued in negligences and strict liability. The jury awarded the plaintiff $16 million in actual damages and $15 million in punitive damages. Ford appealed the verdict pursuant to Rule 204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.

ISSUES: Ford raised issues on appeal relating to (i) the design defect claim (including whether negligence could survive if the trial court granted a directed verdict on strict liability, as well as the proper test for determining if a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous in a design defect claim), (ii) the admission of post-distribution evidence, evidence of other similar incidents, and use of certain evidence during closing arguments, as well as the format of the verdict form, and (iii) the excessiveness of actual and punitive damages. The Court also addressed the issue of the alignment of the parties.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial.

RULES AND OPINION: Set forth below is a summary of the Court's opinion, providing headings concerning the subject matter and primary holdings in bold-faced type.

Design Defect Claims

First, the Court held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on Plaintiff's strict liability seatbelt claim, but not on the same claim brought in negligence. At trial, Plaintiff claimed that Ford was negligent in failing to adequately test the seatbelt sleeve, but did not challenge the seatbelt sleeve design. Plaintiff had also brought a companion strict liability claim. The trial court directed a verdict on the strict liablity claim, but not on the negligence claim. Because the two claims have common elements (namely, the requirement that the product be in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition), Ford argued that the negligence claim should have also been dismissed. The Court agreed: "When an element common to multiple claims is not established, all related claims must fail." Whether or not the manufacturer was at fault -- the additional element required for a products liability claim brought pursuant to a negligence theory -- is not even reached if a plaintiff cannot prove the predicate element of defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product. The Court distinguished the Court of Appeals decision in Bragg v. Hi-Ranger on this issue and emphasized that the critical inquiry as to whether one of the claims survives (where the other is dismissed) is the grounds for the dismissal. Significantly, the Court also agreed with Ford's argument that there is no separate "failure to test" claim apart from the duty to design and manufacture a product that is not defective and unreasonably dangerous. If the product is not defective and unreasonably dangerous, then failure to test cannot be a proximate cause of an injury.

With regard to the "handling and stability" design defect claim, the Court did not find error in the trial court's submission of these design defect claims to the jury. In reaching this determination, the Court reviewed certain testimony by Plaintiff's expert Dr. Melvin Richardson, former Ford Vice President Thomas Feaheny, and certain internal Ford documents relied upon by Dr. Richardson. In short, the Court discussed the evolution of the Bronco II's suspension, including competing views by Ford engineers and Ford executives about the different suspension options, including the "MacPherson" suspension and the "Twin I-Beam" suspension. The testimony and evidence related to the stability of the vehicles while using alternative suspensions, how using the different suspension options would affect rollout of new models, how they would impact other features of the vehicle, and the procedures and motivations behind selecting certain suspension options. Dr. Richardson testified that from all of the evidence, the Bronco II was "dangerously unstable" when it was designed and built, and that no improvements were made to correct this defect. After reviewing the evidence that was presented, the Court agreed with the trial judge's determination that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of a design defect known to Ford at or prior to the date of manufacture to withstand a directed verdict motion.

Next, the Court disagreed with Ford's contention that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of a reasonable alternative design pursuant to the risk-utility test, but agreed that South Carolina law requires a risk-utility test in design defect cases (to the exclusion of the consumer expectations test.) The Court reviewed the prior opinions summarizing the two tests in Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 262, 286 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1982) and Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, 319 S.C. 531, 543, 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (Ct. App. 1995). [The two tests are summarized here, as stated in Bragg]. After reviewing the prior case law, the Court again reviewed the competing suspension options (summarized above) and believed that Plaintiff's focus on the Macpherson suspension was evidence of feasible alternative design. The Court stated that whether this alternative satisfied the risk-utility test was a jury question, but the evidence itself was sufficent to survive a directed verdict motion. The Court then held that "the exclusive test in a products liability design case is the risk-utility test with its requirement of showing a feasible alternative design." While the consumer expectations test fits well in manufacturing defect cases, the Court agreed with Ford that it is ill-suited in design defect cases. The Court noted that in 1974, South Carolina's Legislature adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402(A) (1965) and identified its comments as legislative intent in S.C. Code section 15-73-10 through 15-73-30. However, since this adoption, the Court noted that the American Law Institute has published the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998), and that this edition moved away from the consumer expectations test for design defects, and toward the risk-utility test. The Court stated that it did not believe that the Legislature intended to foreclose court consideration of developments in products liability law. The Court noted that its approval of the risk-utility test in the Claytor case had not prompted a legislative response, and the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions now employ some form of the risk-utility test.

We believe that in design defect cases the risk-utility test provides the best means for analyzing whether a product is designed defectively. Unlike the consumer expectations test, the focus of a risk-utility test centers upon the alleged defectively designed product. The risk-utility test provides objective factors for a trier of fact to analyze when presented with a challenge to a manufacturer's design. Conversely, we find the consumer expectations test and its focus on the consumer ill suited to determine whether a product's design is unreasonably dangerous.
The court reviewed prior cases in which there was an emphasis on showing a feasible alternative design in the context of a risk-utility analysis, including Claytor, Bragg, Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171, 176, 246 S.E.2d176, 178 (1978), Sunvillas Homeowners Ass'n v. Square D Co., 301 S.C. 330, 334, 391 S.E.2d 868, 870 (Ct. App. 1990), and Gasque v. Heublein , Inc., 281 S.C. 278, 283, 315 S.E.2d 556, 559 (Ct. App. 1984). [A review of feasible alternative design law preceding Branham v. Ford Motor Co. can be found here]. The Court noted as follows:
The very nature of feasible alternative design evidence entails the manufacturer's decision to employ one design over another. This weighing of costs and benefits attendant to that decision is the essence of the risk-utility test.
The Court then cited to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 2(b) (1998) and University of South Carolina Professor David Owen's article Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing" Costs and Benefits, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1661, 1687 (1997) to support the risk-utility test and reasonable alternative design (as a requirement of same). The Court stated that the core of the risk-utility balancing test is whether a product was made safe enough, but cautioned that it also adhered to its longstanding principle that just because a product can be made safer does not mean that the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous.

Evidentiary Issues Justifying
Reversal and Remand for New Trial

Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand a directed verdict on the handling and stability design defect claim, the Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, citing three reasons.

First, Ford was prejudiced by Plaintiff's unrelenting pursuit of post-distribution evidence on the issue of liability. The Court reviewed South Carolina's requirement that a plaintiff must show the product was in a defective condition "'at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller.'" (quoting Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 264, 286 S.E.2d 129, 131-32 (1982). Post-distribution evidence is "evidence of facts neither known nor available at the time of distribution." The Court again cited to Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 2, cmt. a (1998) to support that assessing liability in a products liability claim requires evaluation of a manufacturer's decision based on what was known or "reasonably attainable" at the time of manufacture.
The use of post-distribution evidence to evaluate a product's design through the lens of hindsight is improper.
The Court reviewed numerous examples of post-distribution evidence emphasized by Plaintiff at trial and through Dr. Richardson to support a higher rollover tendency of the Bronco II t(evidence hat came to light after manufacture). The Court found this evidence to be prejudicial and stated that "the law should encourage manufacturers to continue to improve their products in terms of utility and safety free from prior design decisions judged through the lens of hindsight."

Second, the trial court agreed that admission of certain post-distribution "other incident" evidence was prejudicial to Ford, but also ruled against Ford on certain pre-manufacture "other incident" evidence. The Court surveyed South Carolina's law that similar accidents are admissible if the tend to prove or disprove some fact in dispute. However, the Court noted that it need not even address whether certain post-distribution evidence admitted into evidence was "substantially similar." "The post-manufacture evidence of purported similar incidents was error, even if the 'substantially similar' threshold was met." The Court reiterated that post-manufacture evidence of similar incidents is not admissible to provide liability. The Court then reviewed the pre-manufacture rollover data introduced by Plaintiff with regard to the Bronco II and other vehicles in the same class. The Court disagreed with Ford's contention that the pre-manufacture comparative evidence of rollover accidents violated the "substantially similar" test articulated in Whaley v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 483, 609 S.E.2d 286, 300 (2005) and revisited in Watson v. Ford Motor Co., Op. No. 26786 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Mar. 15, 2010) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 10 at 37). Even though there was no showing that the cause of the other accidents was similar to the Plaintiff's rollover accident, the Court found that the rate of rollover of the Bronco II compared to other vehicles was relevant to whether the Bronco II had an unreasonably dangerous tendency to rollover. The Court was not persuaded by Ford's arguments that many accidents may be attributable to inexperienced or impaired drivers, or that Hale's inattention was the cause of the accident.

Third, Plaintiff's counsel's closing argument was designed to inflame and prejudice the jury. The Court provided six different examples of excerpts from the closing argument that served as examples of its inflammatory and prejudicial content. The Court also noted that much of the argument was based on inadmissible evidence.

Next, in light of the remand for a new trial, (and without addressing whether it was prejudicial to Ford) the Court held that the trial court's requirement that jthe ury apportion liability between Ford and Hale on the verdict form was error. Because the accident occurred in 2001, Ford and Hale were joint tortfeasors, meaning that they were jointly and severably responsible for all damages. Therefore, there could be no apportionment of fault. The Court noted that that it had reaffirmed the applicability of joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors since adopting the doctrine of comparative negligence. The Court further rejected the trial court's rationale that the apportionment was necessary to ensure that any punitive damages award was based on negligence, and not strict liability (for which punitive damages are not recoverable, discussed here).

Excessiveness of Damages Issues Raised by Ford

Next, the Court addressed the jury's award of $16 million in actual damages and $15 million in punitive damages. In light of the remand for a new trial, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve Ford's claim that the actual damages award was grossly excessive.

With regard to punitive damages, the Court found that the issue was properly submitted to the jury, but agreed that the award could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Because of the new trial, the Court addressed Plaintiff's reliance on "harm to others" in the closing argument. A central theme of the closing argument was that the jury should punish Ford for harming all Bronco II rollover victims. The trial court charged the jury not to punish Ford for other "conduct." The Court found that this charge violated the "harm to others" prohibition because by focusing on conduct, as opposed to harm to Plaintiff, the charge invited the jury to punish Ford for all Bronco rollover deaths and injuries, which is forbidden by Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 653, 602 S.E.2d 760, 767 (2004) and Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 350, 353 (2007).

With regard to financial data, the Court stated that South Carolina upholds that the wealth of a defendant is a relevant factor in assessing punitive damages. The Court reviewed Plaintiff counsel's focus on extrapolating financial data in such a manner so as to break it down in terms of daily income, hourly income, etc. Although prior opinions have not found abuse of discretion in the admission of per day earnings of a defendant, the Court believed that evidence of "net worth" appears to be the safest harbor and directed that the retrial be confined to such evidence. The Court also found that the Plaintiff's introduction Ford's senior management compensation (including salaries, bonuses, stock options, etc.) to be error and highly prejudicial.

Alignment of Parties

Finally, the Court addressed Ford's claim that the trial court should have realigned Hale as a plaintiff. Although the Court did not find that this issue was preserved for review, it addressed it "in the hope that our speaking to the matter will aid the bench and the bar." The Court reviewed the evidence at trial to support that Hale sat on the plaintiff's side during the trial and only cross examined one witness for Plaintiff (and the sole question to Plaintiff's economic expert was, "How many millions are in a billion?"). The Court concluded that the only bona fide defendant in the case was Ford. The Court reviewed Rule 21 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and its federal counterpart, as well as federal and state authority interpreting them. From this review, the Court adopted the rule that trial court's have the authority to realign parties "at any state of the action." It is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbged on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.

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