A blog for individuals and product manufacturers who are interested in South Carolina products liability law. My goal is to provide current information on trends in products liability law in the Palmetto State.
Monday, February 22, 2010
New Subscribing Function
If anyone signs up for this function and you start getting spammed, let me know and I will remove it. If it works as advertised, I thought that it may be a good way for individuals to be notified of new content (without having to check the site every day).
Case Brief: Scott v. Fruehauf Corp.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND: The case involves a defective wheel assembly manufactured by Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. and sold to a trailer manufacturer. 302 S.C. at 367, 396 S.E.2d at 356. The wheel assembly's rim and ring were not designed to be used together. Id. The trailer manufacturer sold the trailer in question to Defendant Fruehauf Corp. ("Fruehauf") in used condition. Id. Fruehauf repaired and reconditioned the trailer, including the tires, but did not break down the wheel assemblies. Id. Fruehauf then sold the trailer to Defendant Piedmont ("Piedmont"), who leased it to Plaintiff's employer. Id. Plaintiff was injured when he attempted to place the wheel assembly on the axle of a trailer. Id. The wheel rim and side ring separated, striking Plaintiff in the head and causing severe head trauma. Id.
PROCEDURE: Plaintiff settled his claim against Firestone for $675,000, with a guarantee of $200,000 if he did not recover against the other parties. 302 S.C. 367, 396 S.E.2d at 356. Plaintiff brought an action against Fruehauf and Piedmont and won $1,125,000 in actual damages against both defendants. Id., 396 S.E.2d at 355. The verdict against Fruehauf was based on strict liability and negligence, and the verdict against Piedmont was based on strict liability only. Id., 396 S.E.2d at 356. Plaintiff also won $1,125,000 in punitive damages from Fruehauf. Id., 396 S.E.2d at 355. The jury also found for Piedmont with regard to its indemnification cross claim against Fruehauf. Id.
ISSUES: The appellate issues that are most substantive in terms of products liability law are as follows: (1) whether strict liability applied where the wheel assembly was placed in the stream of commerce prior to July 9, 1974 (the effective date of the strict liability statute); (2) whether a supplier of a defective product can be liable for negligence if there is no privity between the supplier and injured party; (3) whether the trial court's decision to deny Fruehauf's motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. concerning certain issues and submit them to the jury was proper; (4) whether the jury's award of punitive damages against Fruehauf in a strict liability case was proper; and (5) whether the trial judge erred in submitting Piedmont's cross claim for indemnity to the jury. 302 S.C. at 368-71, 396 S.E.2d at 356-58.
RULES AND OPINION: With regard to the first issue, the court disagreed that the manufacture dates of the mismatched ring (1968) and rim (1972) were the pertinent dates for triggering application of the strict liability statute. 302 S.C. at 368, 396 S.E.2d at 356. "The pertinent date to determine [the strict liability statute's] application is the date the product was sold by the seller," and not the manufacture date." Id. (citing Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co., 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E.2d 735 (1983)). Since Fruehauf sold the trailer to Piedmont in 1976 and Piedmont leased the trailer in 1979, the strict liability statute applied. 302 S.C. at 369, 396 S.E.2d at 356.
The court also disagreed with Fruehauf's contention that Plaintiff failed to establish that Fruehauf owed him a duty of care since it did not design or manufacture the wheel assembly and was merely a seller. 302 S.C. at 369, 396 S.E.2d at 357. "In South Carolina, . . . the supplier of a defective product is accountable to an injured party on ordinary negligence principles despite a lack of privity." Id. (citing Carolina Home Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong Furnace Co., 259 S.C. 346, 191 S.E.2d 774 (1972)).
The court agreed with the trial court's decision to deny Fruehauf's motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. with regard to the issue of whether it breached its duty of care. Id. The evidence supported that Fruehauf was aware of the danger of a mismatched rim as early as 1963 and failed to properly inspect the wheel assembly. Id. Therefore, the issue of breach of duty was properly submitted to the jury. Id. Similarly, there was evidence that Plaintiff's employer warned him to put the tires in a cage before inflating them to avoid exploding rims. 302 S.C. at 369-70, 396 S.E.2d at 357. Therefore, whether Plaintiff assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent were also issues for the jury, and the trial court properly denied Fruehauf's directed verdict and j.n.ov. motions on these issues. Id.
With regard to Fruehauf's punitive damages issue, the court agreed that Barnwell v. Barber Colman Co., 301 S.C. 534, 393 S.E.2d 162 (1989) disallowed punitive damages in an action based solely on strict liability. 302 S.C. at 370, 396 S.E.2d at 357. However, in this case, the jury found Fruehauf liable on both strict liability and negligence causes of action. Id. Punitive damages are recoverable in a negligence cause of action when the conduct rises to the level of a willful, wanton or malicious violation of the plaintiff's rights. Id. (citing Harris v. Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 199 S.E.2d 65 (1973)). From the evidence, the jury could have reached this conclusion, so the court affirmed the award. Id.
Finally, the court agreed that the trial judge erred in submitting Piedmont's cross claim for indemnification to the jury. Id. Fruehauf and Piedmont shared a common liability to Plaintiff under South Carolina' strict liability law. 302 S.C. at 371, 396 S.E.2d at 358. Both contributed to Plaintiff's injury by selling a defective product. Id. "Parties that have no legal relation to one another and who owe the same duty of care to the injured party share a common liability and are joint tortfeasors without a right of indemnity between them." Id. (citing Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963)). This principle required reversal of the trial court's decision. Id. Since both defendants were jointly liable, the court also held that each was entitled to benefit from the setoff for the $675,000 Firestone settlement. Id. The setoff should apply to the award for actual damages instead of the punitive damages award. Id.
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Tuesday, February 16, 2010
Upcoming DRI Drug/Medical Device Conference
The Defense Research Institute is holding their Drug and Medical Device Conference in San Francisco, California this year on May 20-21. Set forth below is the information about the event from DRI's webpage (which you can go to directly at http://www.dri.org/open/SeminarDetail.aspx?eventCode=20100070 ). I attended this conference a few years ago, and it provides a great opportunity to network with other professionals in the drug/medical device arena of products liability work. I also managed to bank up a ton of CLE that seemed to carry over forever, which is also nice.
Information is provided below.
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Description
DRI’s 26th annual Drug and Medical Device Seminar is the preeminent program for practitioners who represent pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers. We are pleased again to feature a number of nationally recognized attorneys, both in-house and outside counsel, and other professionals, who will address cutting-edge topics that are relevant to all who practice in this area, whether they are associates, lead trial counsel, or in-house counsel. This year’s program will offer a mixture of presentations, such as trial skills demonstrations, panel discussions and individual presentations from leaders in their practice areas. In addition to the outstanding program, there will be numerous networking opportunities, including our annual Young Lawyers Blockbuster. Plan now to join us in San Francisco!
Registration Information
REGISTRATION:The registration fee is $895 for members and those who join DRI when registering and $1,025 for non-members. The registration fee includes CD-ROM course materials, continental breakfasts, refreshment breaks and networking receptions. If you wish to have your name appear on the registration list distributed at the conference and receive the CD-ROM course materials in advance, DRI must receive your registration by Apirl 30, 2010 (please allow 10 days for processing mail registrations). Registrations received after April 30, 2010, will be processed on-site. The link for registration for individuals who are not members of DRI can be found here. If you are a member, logon to the DRI website, and you can register there to receive the member rate for the conference.
HOTEL ACCOMODATIONS: A limited number of discounted hotel rooms have been made available at the San Fracisco Marriott Marquis , 55 Fourth Street, San Francisco, California 94103. For reservations, contact the hotel directly at 415.896.1600. Please mention DRI’s Drug and Medical Device Seminar to take advantage of the group rate of $283 Single/Double. The hotel block is limited and rooms and rates are available on a first-come, firstserved basis. You must make reservations by April 21, 2010, to be eligible for the group rate. Requests for reservations made after April 21 are subject to room and rate availability.
TRAVEL DISCOUNTS: DRI offers discounted meeting fares on various major air carriers for DRI’s Asbestos Medicine Seminar attendees. To receive these discounts, please contact Hobson Travel Ltd., DRI’s official travel provider at 800.538.7464 or you can book your travel on online at RESX.com. If you are a first time user use dri as company, your first initial and last name as Member ID and leave password blank the first time you login to enter a password. As always, to obtain the lowest available fares, early booking is recommended.
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Drilling Down: The Duty to Warn and the "Obvious Risk" Associated With Cell Phone Use While Driving
There has been a great deal of press lately concerning cell phone use while driving, including a recent settlement in a South Carolina case involving a driver who was using her cell phone when she struck and killed two cyclists. The case and settlement prompted me to wonder one morning, "Will we ever see a warning on a cell phone advising not to use it while driving? Or to be careful using it while driving?" As ridiculous as the proposal may sound, I looked at the fast food coffee cup I was holding that said "Caution: Contents Are Extremely Hot" and began to wonder...
So what is the law?
South Carolina courts have held that seller is not required to warn of dangers or potential dangers that are generally known and recognized by users. Anderson v. Green Bull, Inc., 322 S.C. 268, 270, 471 S.E.3d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 1996). In such cases, the product is not defective or unreasonably dangerous because these dangers are contemplated by the ultimate user. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g. (1965) for the principle that “a product is defective only ‘where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.”) (emphasis in original). These dangers are frequently referred to as “obvious risks,” which include matters that should be common sense to the user.
For example, in Dema v. Shore Enterprises, Ltd., 312 S.C. 528, 435 S.E.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1993), the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that an Aqua-Cycle water recreational vehicle was not defective for failure to include a warning label cautioning the user to “watch out for swimmers” and to “avoid strong current, wind, or waves.” In reaching its conclusion, the court stated as follows:
[U]sers of the Aqua-Cycle would be aware, as a matter of common sense, that they should be careful around swimmers in the surf. Because it is obvious that an Aqua-Cycle can cause injury to a swimmer, [the manufacturer] did not have a duty to warn Aqua-Cycle users of that risk.Id. at 531-32, 435 S.E.2d at 876. South Carolina courts have used similar analysis to determine that there is no duty to warn about overtightening of lug nuts so as to avoid cracking them. Claytor v. General Motors, Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E.2d 129 (1982). The general notion is that a person should know-- from common sense -- that if you tighten something too much, you could break it.
In this blogger's opinion, this is the area of law that is applicable to cell phones and whether there is a duty to warn about cell phone use while driving. It is pretty obvious (and a matter of common sense in my opinion) that there is a risk associated with looking at a cell phone, fumbling with it, holding it, trying to press those small numbers on it, or otherwise trying to use it while doing a dangerous activity, such as driving. Why? Because the user is devoting attention to the cell phone instead of the potentially dangerous activity in which they are engaged: driving a 4,000 pound vehicle at a rate of speed and on a road with other vehicles, cyclists, etc.
So, is there a duty to warn a cell phone user not to use their cell phone while driving, or to use caution? Though I am sure that someone may try and make this argument (if they have not already), this seems to be a classic case of "obvious risk."
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Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Drilling Down: The Analytical Framework for Warnings
I have a five-year-old daughter who is my "spirited child." She would make an excellent lawyer because she is an absolute bulldog when it comes to negotiating, and she hates to lose. However, I find that we frequently run into some variation of the following scenario when it comes to matters of discipline.
Me: "Honey, if you are not going to do what I say, then you are going to have to go to bed early."
Daughter: [Does exactly the opposite of what I told her to do].
Me: "Okay, then time for you to go to bed."
Daughter: "But what about family movie night?"
Me: "You will not be watching family movie night, because you will be in bed."
Daughter: "BUT I DIDN'T REALIZE THAT IS WHAT YOU MEANT!!!" (followed by uncontrollable sobbing).
In her own way, my daughter tries to convince me that I did not provide her with an adequate warning...one that sufficiently conveys the risks of performing or not performing certain actions. She does not succeed very often (as I know that she is very smart and that she understood exactly what I said), but this does not stop her from trying.
Similarly, in the realm of products liability litigation, a central focus is frequently whether a manufacturer or seller had a duty to warn the user of a product about potential dangers, and if so, whether the warning was adequate to convey the risks. So I want to write a bit about South Carolina warnings law.
South Carolina law recognizes that many products cannot be made completely safe for use. Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 264, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982). However, these products may still be useful, desirable, and serve a purpose. Id. In such cases, if the product is properly designed, manufactured, and packaged with accompanying adequate warnings and instructions, then they are not defective. Id. Otherwise, manufacturers and sellers may be discouraged from marketing many products solely because some danger accompanies the use of the product. Id.
Therefore, “[i]n order to prevent a product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give a warning on the product concerning its use.” Anderson v. Green Bull, Inc., 322 S.C. 268, 270, 471 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1996); see also Claytor v. General Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 264, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982). If a product includes a warning that – if followed – makes it safe for use, then the product is not defective or unreasonably dangerous. Anderson, 322 S.C. at 270, 471 S.E.2d at 710; Allen v. Long Mfg. NC, Inc., 332 S.C. 422, 427, 404 S.E.2d 354, 357 (Ct. App. 1998). This foundation of South Carolina warnings law is discussed at length in comment j. to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and South Carolina has incorporated this comment by reference into its strict liability statute as the legislative intent of the chapter. See S.C. Code § 15-73-30 (“Comments to § 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second, are incorporated herein by reference thereto as the legislative intent of this chapter.”).
A review of comment j. and the case law interpreting it reveals that the warnings analysis is based on a twofold inquiry: (1) whether there is a duty to warn to begin with, and (2) whether the warning provided is “adequate” so that (if followed) the product is safe for use. See, e.g., Allen v. Long Mfg. NC, Inc., 332 S.C. 422, 427-28, 505 S.E.2d 354, 357 (Ct. App. 1998) (separating the warnings analysis into a determination of duty to warn and adequacy of the warning).
Check back for more on warnings. I hope to make this a new series.
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Friday, January 15, 2010
Case Brief: State v. Astra Zeneca
This case brief involves an action brought by South Carolina Attorney General Henry McMaster against a pharmaceutical company, captioned State v. Astra Zeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP, 2009 WL 1227848 (D.S.C. May 5, 2009). It is significant because it discusses off-label promotion and preemption, and the extent to which they can serve as a basis for federal question jurisdiction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Defendants manufactured an anti-psychotic drug known as Seroquel. The State sued Defendants to recover funds expended by South Carolina to provide medical treatment to certain Medicaid and state employee participants who experienced Seroquel-related illnesses, as well as to recover funds spent in purchasing Seroquel for off-label uses not covered by certain state programs. The State alleged causes of action for submission of false and fraudulent claims under the Medicaid program, violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, negligence, breach of warranty, fraud and misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment in connection with Defendants' marketing of Seroquel.
PROCEDURE: The State filed its case in state court on January 9, 2009. Defendants removed the case to federal court (D.S.C., Spartanburg Division) based on federal question jurisdiction. Defendants also moved to stay the case pending transfer by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation. The State moved to remand on February 18, 2009, and it filed a motion to transfer the case to Judge Henry Herlong on February 23, 2009. The MDL Panel issued a conditional transfer order on February 26, 2009 transfering the action to the Middle District of Florida as part of the Seroquel MDL. On March 12, 2009, the Court granted in part Defendants' motion to stay the case, staying all issues except the pending motions to remand and transfer.
ISSUES: Pending before the court was the State's motion to remand the case to state court and its motion to transfer the case to Judge Herlong.
DISPOSITION: The court granted the State's remand motion, which rendered moot its motion to transfer.
RULES AND OPINION: Although the State did not assert a federal cause of action in its Complaint, Defendants maintained that the Court should exercise federal question jurisdiction because the case raises substantial questions of federal law, e.g. an examination of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and other federal statutes. Defendants relied on the rule in the United States Supreme Court decision of Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) as the applicable law, as follows:
[D]oes a state law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicialThe Court rejected Defendants' argument that the State's off-label promotion allegations implicated significant federal questions. First, the Court pointed out that this same argument was rejected by Judge Henry Herlong in State v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 2007 WL 2261693 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2007) and State v. Janssen Pharmaceutica Inc., 2007 WL 2022173 (D.S.C. July 10, 2007). Second, the Court did not believe that the the State's claims had anything to do with "off-label" uses, as that term is defined in federal law. Finally, the Court did not believe that -- in applying the Grable test -- any references to "off-label" uses in the case were "substantial enough" to justify the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. "As alleged, the State could establish a prima facie case of Medicaid fraud under state law without having to establish that Defendants' communications were 'off-label' in violation of federal law."
responsibilities."
The Court also rejected Defendants' arguments that the case raised substantial federal questions under federal Medicaid law. These arguments were also rejected by Judge Herlong in the above-referenced cases, and the Court quoted extensively from Judge Herlong's Janssen opinion as support for its decision. Judge Herlong's decision on this issue focused on the fact that (i) Defendants' liability depended on their breach of duties defined by state law, and (ii) the Federal Medicaid Act does not provide a private right of action, which further supports that there is no federal question jurisdiction.
Finally, the Court rejected Defendants' argument that the federal preemption issues implicated by Plaintiff's failure to warn claims raised a federal question. "Defendants concede that a failure to warn preemption defense has never been held sufficient to convey federal jurisdiction."
Based on its decision to grant Plaintiff's remand motion, it determined that the Plaintiff's motion to transfer the case to Judge Herlong was rendered moot.
This post is subject to the DISCLAIMER & TERMS OF USE of this website.Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Upcoming DRI Products Liability Conference
The Defense Research Institute is holding their Products Liability Conference in Las Vegas, Nevada this year, and a colleague provided me with some information about it, which I have pasted below. I will be attending this conference and look forward to meeting anyone there.
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Don’t gamble when it comes to Product Liability! This year’s DRI Product Liability Conference - The Masters of Products: The Stars Come Out to Shine is a sure bet. The conference will take place April 7-9, 2010 at The Venetian in beautiful Las Vegas, Nevada.
In addition to all that Vegas has to offer, the seminar promises 18.5 hours of outstanding CLE, including 2 hours of ethics credit. The main program features presentations by Inez Moore Tenenbaum, Chair of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission; Steven Gensler, Professor at the University of Oklahoma College of Law; Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Court, Southern District of Texas; outside and in-house counsel experienced in managing global product liability litigation, trial of difficult cases including wrongful death and class actions, the use of demonstrative evidence and other trial tactics in product liability litigation, the new CPSIA and the reporting database, and the art of storytelling as a trial lawyer.
The 18 Specialized Litigation Groups (SLGs) will conduct workshops where you can hone your skills in specific areas. And of course, the program will be attended by in-house and outside counsel from around the country, with ample opportunities to meet, greet and network.
Register for this seminar NOW on line, by logging on to www.dri.org or by printing the registration form on the back of the brochure and either fax or mail it in. You can also call DRI Customer Service at 312.795.1101 for more information.
We’ll see you in Las Vegas.
Tuesday, January 5, 2010
The Basics: Breach of Warranty Overview
I have not posted much on the breach of warranty theory for a products liability action, so I am hoping to do another "series" of sorts that covers various aspects of this theory. A summer associate with whom I worked last year, Andrew DeHoll, did a great deal of work on researching warranty law for me, so I want to give him recognition for all his help. Thanks very much Andrew!
If this turns into a series, it makes sense to start out with a general overview. South Carolina law allows people injured by defective products to recover damages under three contract theories: breach of an express warranty, breach of an implied warranty of merchantability; and breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. See Herring v. Home Depot, Inc., 350 S.C. 373, 379–80, 565 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Breach of warranty is an action affirming the contract."). These theories are codified at S.C. Code sections 36-2-313 (express warranty), 36-2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability), and 36-2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose). Unlike other products liability theories (which have a statute of limitations of three years), a claim brought pursuant to a warranty theory has a statute of limitations of six years, as set forth in S.C. Code section 36-2-725.
(As discussed in prior blogs, any products liability theory in South Carolina requires proof of three foundational elements, and breach of warranty is no exception. A plaintiff must prove: (1) the plaintiff or his or her property was injured by the product; (2) the injury occurred because the product was in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user; and (3) at the time of the accident, the product was in essentially the same condition as when it left the hands of the defendant. For a full explanation of the case law behind these three elements, see this post.)
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