Case Brief: Riley v. Ford Motor Co.

I am trying to get back into blogging and catching up on some cases that have been decided in South Carolina over the last few years.  Today’s case is Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 414 S.C 185, 777 S.E.2d 824 (2015).  It is a defective door latch case where the decedent was thrown from a Ford F-150.  The substance of the case relates to (i) whether the trial judge should have granted a $600,000 additur to the verdict, and (ii) how to apply South Carolina’s setoff law.  There is no real analysis of products issues per se, but it is worth a read from a procedural standpoint.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Benjamin Riley was involved in an automobile accident in a Ford F-150 when another driver pulled out in front of him.  He swerved, collided anyway, and the impact caused the driver’s door of Riley’s pick-up to open.  Riley was ejected and died from his injuries.  414 S.C. at 189, 777 S.E.2d at 826.

PROCEDURE: Riley’s widow, as his Personal Representative (“Plaintiff’), filed survival and wrongful death claims against the opposing driver and Ford.  414 S.C. at 189, 777 S.E.2d at 827.  The case against Ford alleged a negligently designed door latch system that resulted in Riley’s ejection.  Plaintiff settled with the opposing driver for $25,000 and allocated $20,000 to the survival claim and $5,000 to the wrongful death claim.  The trial judge approved the settlement.  Id.

At trial, Plaintiff only submitted the wrongful death claim against Ford to the jury, and it returned a verdict for $300,000 in actual damages.  The jury found evidence of conduct to support punitive damages but declined to award them.  Id.

Plaintiff sought a new trial nisi additur (to add damages), which the trial court granted in the amount of $600,000.  This brought the total recovery to $900,000.  Id.  Ford filed post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to offset the opposing driver’s settlement.  The trial judge denied these motions.  Id. at 190, 777 S.E.2d at 827.

Ford appealed and the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed in Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 408 S.C. 1, 757 S.E.2d 422 (Ct. App. 2014).  It held the trial court erred in denying Ford’s motion for setoff and in granting Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial nisi additur.  It reinstated the jury’s $300,000 verdict.  It also held Ford was entitled to offset $20,000 against the jury’s verdict in the wrongful death action, as opposed to the $5,000 that the settling defendant agreed to allocate to that claim.  Id. at 190-91, 777 S.E.2d at 828. 

Plaintiff appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court on both issues.

ISSUES: (1) Did the court of appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order granting a new trial nisi additur, i.e., because the trial court’s decision was an appropriate exercise of discretion and was supported? (2) Did the court of appeals err in reallocation of the underlying settlement and setoff of settlement proceeds?  414 S.C. at 192, 777 S.E.2d at 827-28. 

DISPOSITION: Reversed on both issues.  414 S.C. at 192, 777 S.E.2d at 827-28. 

RULES AND OPINION: The Court first addressed a motion by a party for a new trial based on a challenge that the verdict is either excessive or inadequate.  The rule with regard to this issue is that “’the trial judge must distinguish between awards that are merely unduly liberal or conservative and awards that are actuated by passion, caprice, or prejudice.’”  414 S.C. at 192, 777 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Durham, 314 S.C. 529, 530-31, 431 S.E.2d 557, 558 (1993)).  If it is the former, then the trial judge alone has the power to alter the verdict by granting of a new trial nisi.  If it is the latter, it is the duty of the trial court and the appellate court to set aside the verdict absolutely.  Id.  Although the trial judge has discretion, “compelling reasons” must be given to justify the trial court invading the jury’s province in this manner. Id. at 193, 777 S.E.2d at 829 (citing Bailey v. Peacock, 818 S.C. 13, 14, 455 S.E.2d 690, 691 (1995)). 

At trial, Plaintiff presented expert testimony to support economic damages of more than $228,000.  There were also so many witnesses to testify about non-economic damages that the trial judge ruled it became cumulative.  In short, substantial evidence supported the decedent was a wonderful human being.  Id.  The Court held the court of appeals ignored the abuse-of-discretion standard of review and focused on a de novo evaluation of whether there was sufficient justification for “invading the jury’s province.”  Id. at 194, 777 S.E.2d at 829.  The Court held this was error.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting an additur of $600,000 based on the trial judge’s thorough recitation of the basis for his actions.  Id.  The Court also clarified that just because the jury awarded some amount of non-economic damages (over and above the $228,000 in actual damages) did not mean that nisi additur was not available.  “While the presence of some amount of noneconomic damages may be a factor mitigating against the granting of a new trial nisi additur, there is no categorical rule prohibiting a nisi additur where a jury verdict includes some measure of noneconomic damages.”  Id. at 194, 777 S.E.2d at 830. 

On the issue of setoff, “’[a] non-settling defendant is entitled to credit for the amount paid by another defendant who settles for the same cause of action.’”  Id. (quoting Rutland v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 400 S.C. 209, 216, 734 S.E.2d 142, 145 (2012)).  Allowing setoff prevents a double recovery.  The Court recounted the principle of setoff was codified as part of the South Carolina Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act at section 15-38-50(1).  Id.  However, “any ‘reduction in the judgment must be from a settlement for the same cause of action.’”  Id. at 196, 777 S.E.2d at 830 (quoting Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs. Of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 113, 498 S.E.2d 395, 407 (Ct. App. 1998)).  If there is more than one claim, this affects how much a non-settling defendant may be allowed to offset.  Id. 

The issue was whether the court of appeals erred in reapportioning the $25,000 settlement between the survival and wrongful death claims so as to increase the amount Ford could offset against the wrongful death verdict.  The Court found the court of appeals erred in reapportioning the settlement proceeds.  Id. at 196-97, 777 S.E.2d at 831.  It agreed with the approach of the Illinois Court of Appeals, which stated as follows:

A plaintiff who enters into a settlement with a defendant gains a position of control and acquires leverage in relation to a non-settling defendant. This posture is reflected in the plaintiff's ability to apportion the settlement proceeds in the manner most advantageous to it. Settlements are not designed to benefit non-settling third parties. They are instead created by the settling parties in the interests of these parties. If the position of a non-settling defendant is worsened by the terms of a settlement, this is the consequence of a refusal to settle. A defendant who fails to bargain is not rewarded with the privilege of fashioning and ultimately extracting a benefit from the decisions of those who do.

Id. at 197, 777 S.E.2d at 831 (quoting Lard v. AMI FM Ohio, Inc., 327 Ill. Dec. 273, 901 NE.2d at 1019 (2009).
 
The Court held the trial court-approved allocation was reasonable and should not have been disturbed.  Therefore, Ford was entitled to set off only the $5,000 the settlement agreement apportioned to the wrongful death claim, and not the $20,000 reapportioned by the court of appeals.  Id. at 198, 777 S.E.2d at 831. 

This post is subject to the DISCLAIMER AND TERMS OF USE of this website. 

Certified as SC Civil Court Mediator

A few weeks back, I took the Civil Court Mediation Training course offered by the South Carolina Bar.  I have known about this course for some time, and I have been trying to take it for many years.  However, something always seemed to come up.  As context, this is a 40 hour course that basically runs from a Thursday morning to the following Monday, from about 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. each day.  So, it is tough to coordinate it sometimes with (a) a week where you have other things going on at work, and (b) a weekend where your family may have things going on.  However, the stars finally aligned this year, and I was able to complete the course.

It was extremely worthwhile and not what I expected.  I knew that -- because of the duration -- it was going to be a "deep dive" into conflict resolution and negotiation theory/practice.  I figured there would be some human behavior and psychology sprinkled in.  However, let's be honest: if this was 40 hours of lecture on those topics, it would cease being interesting at some point and become a "snoozer." 

Instead, the course did a great job of mixing theory, practice, and a lot of role play in the mediation process.  Each participant had an opportunity to play the role of a mediator in various scenarios, and it was a great opportunity to apply what was learned during the discussion portions of the training.

I also learned that participating in a ton of mediations as counsel for a party does not automatically equate to being a good mediator.  The training really illustrated the differences in being an advocate versus being a neutral, which is the role of a mediator.  The training will obviously affect how I serve as a mediator in cases (once I get an opportunity to mediate some cases), but I think it will also impact how I represent clients at mediation.  I think having insight into the role and tactics of a mediator will be valuable when I am wearing my "advocate" hat because I have a better idea of how the mediator is approaching the case to try and foster a resolution.

After completing the training, I submitted my application to be a certified as a Civil Court Mediator, and I received my certificate today!  I look forward to developing mediation as an area of practice in the future.  I also intend to check out any articles that may be out there that deal with any specific issues/nuances for mediating the products liability case.

This post is subject to the DISCLAIMER AND TERMS OF USE of this website.

Case Brief: Holland ex rel. Knox v. Morbark, Inc.

 

Holland ex rel. Knox v. Morbark, Inc., 407 S.C. 227, 754 S.E.2d 714 (Ct. App. 2014), involves a wood chipper.  Anytime I hear the words "wood chipper" I think of Marge Gunderson in the movie, Fargo: "And I guess that was your accomplice in the wood chipper . . . ."  (Yes, that is a sock-covered foot under that piece of wood).

I guess you could say I have a dark sense of humor, and the truth is, I love that movie.  I have never looked at wood chippers the same since seeing it.  Anyway, read on...

 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiff's job was to clean and change the cutting knives inside a wood chipper.  407 S.C. at 230, 754 S.E.2d at 716.  When he attempted to raise the hood on the machine, the interior fan blades were still rotating and came in contact with the hood.  The contact caused the hood to kick back and strike Plaintiff in the head, injuring him.  Id. 

 

PROCEDURE: Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the wood chipper manufacturer ("Manufacturer"), his employer, a prior owner of the wood chipper (before sale to his employer), and the installer of the wood chipper.  407 S.C. at 231, 754 S.E.2d at 717.  Plaintiff moved to amend his Complaint to dismiss all defendants except Manufacturer and withdraw his negligence claim.  He maintained his actions against Manufacturer for strict liability and breach of warranty.  Manufacturer consented to Plaintiff's first amendment.  Plaintiff filed a second motion to amend his Complaint.  Manufacturer opposed the second motion and filed a motion for summary judgment.  Id. 

 

The circuit court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend his Complaint because it believed allowing the amendment would prejudice Manufacturer.  Id. at 232, 754 S.E.2d at 717.  The circuit court granted Manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on grounds that (1) the wood chipper was not in the same condition at the time of the accident as when it left Manufacturer's hands; (2) Manufacturer's failure to incorporate additional safety features did not render the machine unreasonably dangerous when no other industry manufacturer had incorporated the optional safety device advanced by Plaintiff's expert; and (3) Plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable alternative design as required under South Carolina law.  Id. at 232-33, 754 S.E.2d at 717-18.  The circuit court also dismissed Plaintiff's failure to warn claim.  Id. at 233, 754 S.E.2d at 718.  Plaintiff moved for reconsideration.  After his motion was denied, he appealed.  Id.

 

ISSUES: (1) Did the circuit court err in denying Plaintiff's motion to amend his Complaint; and (2) Did the circuit court err in granting Manufacturer's motion for summary judgment?  407 S.C. at 233, 753 S.E.2d at 718.

 

DISPOSITION: Affirmed by the South Carolina Court of Appeals.

 

RULES AND OPINION:  First, the Court addressed Plaintiff's arguments concerning amendment of his Complaint.  407 S.C. at 233-37, 754 S.E.2d at 718-20.  He argued the circuit court denied his second amendment based on an erroneous conclusion that it had already granted his first motion to amend.  Id. at 233-34, 754 S.E.2d at 718.  In short, Plaintiff argued the court failed to grant his first motion to amend.  The Court of Appeals disagreed.  Although the circuit court issued no separate written order granting the amendment and dismissal of the other defendants, the evidence in the record established the circuit court permitted -- and the parties' consented to -- Plaintiff's amendment.  Indeed, Plaintiff relied on his first amended Complaint in opposing Manufacturer's motion for summary judgment.  His own behavior illustrated his belief that his first amended Complaint was properly before the circuit court.  Id. at 234, 754 S.E.2d at 718.

 

The Court then turned to Plaintiff's second motion to amend his Complaint.  Id. at 235, 754 S.E.2d at 718-19.  It reviewed the standard set forth in Rule 15 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and the rules that (a) a motion to amend is addressed to the circuit court's discretion, and (b) the party opposing the motion has the burden of establishing prejudice.  Id. at 235, 753 S.E.2d at 719.  "Prejudice occurs when the amendment states a new claim or defense that would require the opposing party to introduce additional or different evidence to prevail in the amended action."  Id. (citing Ball v. Canadian Am. Exp. Co., Inc., 314 S.C. 272, 275, 442 S.E.2d 620, 622 (Ct. App. 1994)).  The Court affirmed denial of the second motion to amend because it found Plaintiff was in possession of the additional information about a defect theory after his experts were deposed, but he did not expound on the theory until much later at the motions hearing.  Id.  Although Plaintiff was not seeking to add a new claim, the addition of his defect theory -- raised after extensive discovery -- would have required additional depositions, hiring of rebuttal experts, and delay on the eve of trial.  Id. at 236, 754 S.E.2d at 719.  Furthermore, the second amendment would not occur until over two years after Plaintiff filed his first Complaint.  Therefore, the Court agreement Manufacturer would have been prejudiced by the granting of the second motion to amend.  Id.  The Court also pointed out in dicta that the alleged defect theory was based on an OSHA violation, and OSHA only regulates employers, not manufacturers.  Id. at 236-37, 754 S.E.2d at 719-20. 

 

The Court then turned to the circuit court's grant of summary judgment.  Id. at 237, 754 S.E.2d at 720.  Plaintiff claimed the circuit court erred in relying on Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 701 S.E.2d 5 (2010), and its requirement of proving a reasonable alternative design in design defect cases.  The Court disagreed and said that to prove a reasonable alternative design, Plaintiff was had to set forth some evidence of an alternative design, which included "consideration of costs, safety, and functionality associated with the alternative design."  Id. at 237-38, 754 S.E.2d at 720.  Plaintiff's expert admitted he was unaware of anyone in the industry that had performed a feasibility analysis for an alternative design.  Id. at 238, 754 S.E.2d at 720.  He also admitted he had not prepared an actual design for an interlock system concerning opening the hood and operating blades, only a concept.  "Because a conceptual design is insufficient to establish a reasonable alternative design, we find [Plaintiff's] claim for design defect fails as a matter of law."  Id. (citing Holst v. KCI Konecranes Int'l Corp., 390 S.C. 29, 37, 699 S.E.2d 715, 719-20 (Ct. App. 2010)).  The Court further stated that because proof of reasonable alternative design is necessary in a design defect case, it would not address Plaintiff's remaining claims of error pertaining to his design defect cause of action.  Id. at 238, 754 S.E.2d at 720-721 (citing Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 598, 598 (1999) for the principle that an appellate court may not review remaining issues when determination of a prior issue is dispositive).   

 

The Court then turned to Plaintiff's argument that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on his failure to warn claim.  Id. at 239, 754 S.E.2d at 721.  First, because products liability claims share common elements, Plaintiff's failure to establish a reasonable alternative design in his design defect claim prevented him from succeeding on his failure to warn claim as a matter of law.  Id. (citing to Branham, 390 S.C. at 210, 701 S.E.2d at 8 for principle that failure to establish any one of the three elements in a companion products liability claim is fatal to all related products liability claims). 

 

Notwithstanding this issue, the Court held the circuit court properly granted summary judgment.  The Court recounted the law that "'[a] product bearing a warning that the product is safe for use if the user follows the warning is neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous; therefore, the seller is not liable for any injuries caused by the use of the product if the user ignores the warning.'"  Id. (quoting Anderson v. Green Bull, Inc., 322 S.C. 268, 270, 471 S.E.2d 708, 710 (Ct. App. 1996)).  A seller is also not required to warn of dangers that are generally known and recognized, and therefore a product is not defective or unreasonably dangerous if the danger associated with the product is one the product's users generally recognize.  Id. 

 

With this context, the Court discussed how the wood chipper had decals, warnings, and an owner's manual when it left the hands of Manufacturer in 1996.  Id. at 239-40, 754 S.E.2d at 721.  These warnings were not present when Plaintiff was injured.  However, the owner prior to Plaintiff's employer had affixed warnings on the machine that warned of the potential dangers at issue in the case.  The Court found these warnings were sufficient to render the machine safe for use if the user followed the warnings.  Id. at 240, 754 S.E.2d at 721.   

 

Regardless, the Court believed it would be improper to hold Manufacturer liable for failure to warn since (a) Manufacturer affixed warnings at the time of manufacture, (b) the warnings at issue were affixed by a prior owner of the machine (not Manufacturer), (c) Manufacturer sold the machine ten years prior to the accident, and (d) three intervening owners used the machine before Plaintiff's injury.  Id.  Plaintiff also indicated in his testimony that he appreciated the danger being hit in the head by the hood if he opened it prematurely.  Manufacturer had no duty to warn Plaintiff of a danger he already recognized.  Id. at 240, 754 S.E.2d at 721-22.   

This is an interesting case that mixes in a little of everything.  There is heavy reliance on Branham and Anderson, which I consider to be two of the most important, "meaty" cases in South Carolina products liability law.  In addition, even though the Court does not quote case law concerning the "essentially same condition" element of a products liability action, it is clear there is some reliance on this law in affirming summary judgment.

This post is subject to the DISCLAIMER AND TERMS OF USE of this website.